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Operational excellence is an executional competency that reflects a firm’s ability to run 
its day-to-day operations efficiently, effectively, and profitably. Differing views have been 
expressed regarding the inner dynamics and value creation potential of operational excellence. 
From an inner dynamics perspective, the competency’s dimensions of efficiency and 
effectiveness are viewed by some as conflicting and difficult to reconcile (the tradeoff model), 
and by others as synergistic and mutually supportive (the cumulative model). From a value 
creation perspective, operational excellence is portrayed by some as an effective cash-flow 
generator and a potent enabler of firm growth, and by others as a source of excessive 
routinization that hinders strategic adaptation and limits long-term value creation. The present 
dissertation revisits these conflicting views. 
Drawing on Porter’s profit maximization prescription, essay 1 empirically examines the 
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm 
profitability. In so doing, it assesses the respective merits of the tradeoff and cumulative 
perspectives. Empirical findings based on a multi-industry panel of 595 public US manufacturing 
firms provide relative support for the cumulative perspective; concurrent improvements in 
efficiency and effectiveness are shown to have a compounding positive effect on firm 
profitability. The findings also show that the individual benefits of isolated improvements to 
either efficiency or effectiveness tend to be curvilinear with diminishing returns.  
Addressing the value creation question, essay 2 draws on signaling theory to empirically 
examine the stock market’s ex-ante assessment of operational excellence as an instrument for 
long-term value creation. Contrary to the productivity dilemma narrative, empirical results show 
that market participants tend to have a positive outlook on the value creation potential of 
 
 
operational excellence. The positive outlook is, however, found to be dampened by the stock 
market’s expectations of firm short-term revenue growth and amplified by firm R&D efforts. 
In a third exploratory essay, I discuss environmental and organizational learning factors 
that have the potential to cause firms to grow overinvested in operational excellence at the 
expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. Essay 3 is conceptual in nature and 
provides theoretical propositions for future empirical investigation.  
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I. Introduction  
Operational excellence is a short-term performance indicator that reflects a firm’s ability 
to run its day-to-day operations efficiently, effectively, and profitably (e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 
2008; Mentzer et al., 2008; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). Differing views have been expressed 
regarding the inner dynamics and value creation potential of operational excellence.  
From an inner dynamics perspective, two views stand out in the literature: the tradeoff 
model and the cumulative perspective. The tradeoff model suggests that operational efficiency 
and operational effectiveness are conflicting and difficult to reconcile, making it unlikely that 
firms outperform on both dimensions simultaneously (e.g., Skinner, 1969; Brumme et al., 2015). 
This tradeoff perspective contends that a pragmatic operations strategy is to seek excellence in 
one dimension while maintaining the other at or above a critical threshold (Wheelwright and 
Bowen, 1996). The cumulative perspective, on the other hand, argues that operational efficiency 
and operational effectiveness might be difficult but not impossible to reconcile (Ferdows and De 
Meyer, 1990). Invoking the superior performance of Japanese manufacturers on both 
dimensions, proponents of the cumulative perspective argue that operations strategy should 
facilitate the simultaneous improvement of both efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Clark, 1996; 
Flynn and Flynn, 2004; Heim and Peng, 2010). Essay 1 joins this debate and investigates the 
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm 
profitability. The idea is to determine whether there are limits to focused strategies that aim to 
maximize one competency – either efficiency or effectiveness – while maintaining the other at or 
above a critical threshold; and evaluate if a simultaneously superior performance on both 
competencies can compound firm profitability. Finding empirical support for either conjecture 




Based on a panel dataset of 595 US public manufacturing firms and 2,758 firm-year 
observations, essay 1 shows that isolated improvements to either efficiency or effectiveness do 
indeed result in capped profitability benefits when analyzed across the entire sample; the profit 
impact of improving either competency while holding the other constant is found to be 
curvilinear with diminishing returns. Alternatively, improving both competencies simultaneously 
is shown to have a strictly positive impact on firm profitability, in an indication that firms can 
not only improve both efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously but can do so profitably as 
well. The two findings provide relative support for the cumulative perspective over the tradeoff 
model. However, as I will discuss in detail further into the dissertation, these results may change 
more or less significantly as one looks into specific industries individually. 
The second thrust of this dissertation concerns the long-term value creation potential of 
operational excellence. Differing perspectives exist in this regard as well. On the one hand, the 
productivity dilemma literature argues that operational excellence, despite being beneficial in the 
short term, is likely to induce routinization dynamics that hinder strategic adaptation and limit 
long-term value creation (Adler et al., 2009; Benner and Tushman, 2003). On the other hand, 
empirical evidence from the finance and operations management literatures seem to collectively 
indicate that operational excellence can be an effective cash-flow generator and a potent enabler 
of firm growth and long-term value creation (Fullerton et al., 2003; Myers 1984). 
Essay 2 of this dissertation revisits this contentious relationship by investigating the stock 
market’s ex ante assessment of operational excellence as an instrument for long-term value 
creation. Drawing on signaling theory (Spence, 1973), essay 2 is premised on the idea that 
operational excellence signals embedded in financial statements and accompanying notes will 




market participants will, contrary to the productivity dilemma narrative, view operational 
excellence as a positive signal for long-term value creation. This positive assessment is, 
however, hypothesized to be contextual and contingent on two factors: (a) the market’s 
expectation of firm short-term revenue growth and (b) the firm’s research and development 
efforts. Firm revenue growth expectations are suggested to have a dampening effect on the 
market’s positive assessment whereas firm R&D efforts are expected to have an amplifying 
effect. Empirical results from a panel of 864 publicly traded manufacturing firms in the US and 
3,128 firm-year observations over the 2010-2015 time period provide support for the 
hypothesized relationships. 
A third thrust of this dissertation is to identify conditions under which the pursuit of 
operational excellence can cause firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of operations 
management capabilities at the expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. This 
exploratory effort is inspired by the productivity dilemma argument suggesting that operational 
excellence is most beneficial under stable market conditions (Benner and Tushman, 2003). 
Drawing on the organizational learning literature, the central argument in essay 3 is that a firm’s 
pursuit of operational excellence may be so effective under stable market conditions that it 
causes organizational sense-making to grow biased towards an exaggerated association between 
existing operations management capabilities and competitive advantage. Market stability is 
argued to serve as a double-edged sword that, on the one hand, provides an ideal environment for 
the successful leverage of operations management capabilities and associated operational 
excellence and, on the other, causes firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of such 
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II. Essay 1 – Tradeoff or synergy: The individual and collective effects of efficiency and 
effectiveness on firm profitability  
 
Abstract 
This research explores the inner dynamics of operational excellence by investigating the 
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm 
profitability. Joining a longstanding debate between the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives, I 
draw on Porter’s profit maximization prescription to explore the merits of each. Proponents of 
the tradeoff perspective argue that firms may not be able to reconcile efficiency and effectiveness 
and that a focus on one or the other is necessary to achieve operations-based competitive 
advantage. Supporters of the cumulative perspective, on the other hand, contend that the tradeoff 
model may be presenting a false dichotomy; they argue that firms have grown substantially less 
constrained to sacrifice one competency in the pursuit of another. Based on a large panel of 595 
US public manufacturing firms and 2,758 firm-year observations, the study’s empirical results 
suggest that most manufacturers can indeed enhance efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously 
– with a compounding positive effect on firm gross margin profitability. The findings also show 
that the individual benefits of efficiency and effectiveness are capped when analyzed across the 
entire sample but more nuanced when studied within individual industries. Implications for 






For a long time, mainstream thought in operations strategy advocated a focus on either 
efficiency or effectiveness as a means to achieve operations-based competitive advantage 
(Skinner, 1969). This tradeoff perspective suggested that firms were unlikely to simultaneously 
outperform the competition on both efficiency and effectiveness and that a pragmatic strategy 
was to seek excellence in one competency while maintaining the other at or above a critical 
threshold (Wheelwright and Bowen, 1996). 
Numerous studies have since been conducted, and alternative perspectives have emerged. 
In their study of European manufacturers, Ferdows and De Meyer (1990) proposed that 
efficiency and effectiveness may not be as systematically conflicting as once thought; they 
showed that the two competencies can in fact be mutually supportive such that improving one 
induces a sequential improvement in the other. The finding spurred discussions that proper 
operations strategy may not be one that seeks focused excellence in either efficiency or 
effectiveness, but one that cumulatively facilitates superior achievements on both (e.g., Heim and 
Peng, 2010).  
Research on which of these two perspective holds a higher promise remains inconclusive. 
The largest meta-analytic work to date on the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives indicates that 
results are too conflicting to draw definitive conclusions (Rosenzweig and Easton, 2010). The 
same work shows that most of the extant literature addressing the merits of each perspective is 
cross-sectional, survey-based, and draws on key respondents’ perceptions rather than objective 
measures of efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Boyer and Lewis, 2002). Rosenzweig and Easton 
(2010) called for longitudinal, objective-measure studies that could help advance the debate on 




study responds to that call by investigating the merits of the tradeoff and cumulative 
perspectives, respectively, in a longitudinal setting.  The study also departs from the survey-
based, perceptual approach traditionally used in similar research and relies on objective, 
accounting-based measures of efficiency and effectiveness instead. 
To assess the merit of each perspective, I draw on Porter’s (1996) profit maximization 
prescription. Porter (1996) argues that the pertinence of a firm’s operations strategy is not 
determined by whether the strategy facilitates excellence in efficiency, effectiveness, or both; but 
by the extent to which the resulting operational achievements translate into profitability. As such, 
I empirically investigate the individual and collective effects of efficiency and effectiveness on 
firm profitability. The goal is to 1) determine whether there are limits to focused strategies that 
aim to maximize one competency – efficiency or effectiveness – while maintaining the other at 
or above a critical threshold; and 2) evaluate if a simultaneously superior performance on both 
competencies can compound firm profitability. 
I develop hypotheses in support of both conjectures and empirically test them on a large 
panel of US public manufacturing firms over the 2010-2015 period. Using inventory efficiency 
and supply readiness as key indicators of efficiency and effectiveness respectively, this research 
provides evidence that the individual profit benefits of efficiency and effectiveness are indeed 
capped when analyzed at the sector-level – i.e., across the entire manufacturing sector – but more 
nuanced when looked at within individual industries. Empirical findings also show that most 
manufacturers experience a compounded positive effect on firm profitability when they enhance 
inventory efficiency and supply readiness concurrently. Collectively, these results provide 




profitability – in an indication that there may be untapped potential in the cumulative 
perspective’s prescription. 
This research contributes to the operations strategy literature in several ways. First, it 
assesses the financial performance implications of the efficiency-effectiveness duality, thus 
empirically evaluating the merits of the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives. In so doing, it 
builds on and adds to prior research evaluating the feasibility of concurrent improvements in 
efficiency and effectiveness. Second, the study reinforces the cumulative perspective’s 
proposition that firms can indeed improve profitability by enhancing both efficiency and 
effectiveness simultaneously. This is of particular significance given that many firms still design 
their operations for focused excellence in either efficiency or effectiveness on the premise that 
“few unfocused factories outperform competitors” (Brumme et al., 2015, p. 1513). Third, this 
research provides a longitudinal perspective to the study of tradeoffs in operations strategy, thus 
augmenting the various cross-sectional studies on the subject (Boyer et al., 2005). Fourth, it 
answers Rosenzweig and Easton’s (2010) call for research that uses objective measures of 
efficiency and effectiveness as an alternative to the more commonly used self-report, perception-
based approach. 
From a managerial perspective, the study highlights the benefit of adopting an all-
encompassing approach to operations strategy where the goal is not to achieve focused 
excellence in either efficiency or effectiveness, but to enable superior profitability through a 
proper combination of the two competencies. It also provides managers with a simple metric 
(i.e., operational ambidexterity) to track the extent to which their firm’s operations strategy 





Background and hypotheses 
The role of operations strategy is to devise and implement organizational processes and 
managerial policies that facilitate the efficient and effective execution of firm competitive 
strategy (Boyer et al. 2005). Efficiency and effectiveness support firm competitiveness in two 
distinct ways. The former enhances cost containment and pricing flexibility; the latter enables 
service differentiation and customer value creation (Heikkila, 2002). Although both 
competencies are required for the proper fulfillment of a firm’s value creation and value 
appropriation mandates (Sirmon et al., 2007), research and practice indicate that most firms 
design their operations to maximize one or the other (Parmigiani et al., 2011). 
The pervasiveness of this selective approach to operations design is due to two factors: 
the primacy of focus when formulating a business-level strategy, and the subordination between 
business-level and functional strategies (Wheelwright, 1984). From a strategic focus perspective, 
it is recommended that firms define and pursue key competitive priorities rather than try to be 
excellent at everything at once. Clark (1996, p.45) suggests that “in every business, firms must 
meet minimum standards on all dimensions of customer choice in order to participate effectively. 
But firms that try to do everything exceptionally well and fail to develop competitive priorities 
will end up second-best compared to those firms that concentrate their efforts.” Business-level 
strategic focus is often viewed as a hallmark of the disciplined organization and a prerequisite for 
competitive advantage (Clark, 1996). 
From a subordination perspective, firms typically formulate strategic plans in a layered 
fashion whereby competitive priorities defined at the business-level (a.k.a. competitive strategy) 
dictate the scope and content of subordinate functional strategies such as operations strategy. At 




cultivated in order to position a business for success within a wider competitive landscape 
(Schendel and Hofer, 1979). At the functional level, strategizing consists in developing and 
aligning key capabilities that facilitate the attainment of the overarching competencies delineated 
at the business level (Hambrick, 1980). 
Various typologies of business-level strategy have been proposed over the years (e.g., 
Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Miles and Snow, 1978; Wissema et al., 1980). The most studied in 
the literature and recognized in practice remains Porter’s (1980) classification of generic 
strategies (Gupta and Lonial, 1998). Porter suggests that firms may obtain a competitive 
advantage by properly implementing one of two strategies: product/service differentiation or cost 
leadership. Depending on which strategy a firm pursues, a greater emphasis may be placed – at 
the operations level – on either efficiency or effectiveness. Firms that pursue product/service 
differentiation are likely to aim for excellence in effectiveness as a means to create superior 
customer value whereas those pursuing cost-leadership will tend to go after excellence in 
efficiency as a means to offer competition-comparable value at a lower cost.  
While recognizing the primacy of focus at the business level, recent scholarship in 
operations strategy suggests that such focus need not trickle down to the functional level 
(Rosenzweig and Easton, 2010). With the proliferation of sophisticated process management 
practices (e.g., Total Quality Management, Just-In-Time) and advanced manufacturing 
techniques (e.g., Computer Aided Manufacturing), operations management scholars argue that 
firms are significantly less constrained to sacrifice efficiency to improve effectiveness, or vice 
versa (e.g., Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). It is argued that the traditional tradeoff between the 
two competencies is no longer systematic (Heim and Peng, 2010) and that firms have greater 




(Brumme et al., 2015). The question is no longer one that asks how to maximize efficiency or 
effectiveness in support of a higher-level business strategy, but one that asks what combination 
of the two competencies to aim for in order to maximize firm profitability (Porter, 1996). 
In the following subsections, I develop a series of hypotheses regarding the individual 
and collective effects of efficiency and effectiveness on firm profitability. Individual-effect 
hypotheses address the marginal profit impact of each competency (efficiency and effectiveness) 
holding the other constant, in line with scenarios where firms pursue excellence in one 
competency while maintaining the other at or above a critical threshold. The collective-effect 
hypothesis addresses the impact of various combinations of efficiency and effectiveness (i.e., 
various levels of Operational Ambidexterity) on firm profitability.  
Efficiency (Inventory Efficiency)  
Efficiency is generally defined as the ratio of benefits received to resources expended 
(Bordoloi et al., 1999). In operations management, it is construed as a system’s output-to-input 
ratio (Priem and Butler, 2001; Ross and Droge, 2004). A versatile performance indicator, 
operational efficiency has been adapted “in multiple ways to reflect the range of inputs and 
outputs that are of interest to stakeholders involved in the system” (Ding, 2014, p. 2). Prior 
research explored such variations as inventory efficiency (Eroglu and Hofer, 2014), production 
efficiency (Modi and Mishra, 2011), marketing efficiency (Modi and Mishra, 2011), and time- 
vs. cost-based efficiency (Kortmann et al., 2014). As stated earlier, this study focuses on 
inventory efficiency – construed as a firm’s ability to support sales with a minimal amount of 
inventory (Mishra et al., 2013). This focus is motivated by a desire to contribute to the traditional 
discussion on the a priori tradeoff between inventory efficiency and customer service as an 




Inventory efficiency exerts opposing forces on firm profitability due to its divergent 
impacts on cost containment and revenue generation (Shah and Shin, 2007). Higher levels of 
efficiency enable firms to reduce inventory-related costs (Modi and Mishra, 2013) but, at the 
same time, exacerbate their vulnerability to demand and supply uncertainty (Rumyantsev and 
Netessine, 2007).  
Whether a firm benefits from efficiency enhancements or not is a function of the firm’s 
initial position on the efficiency curve. Eroglu and Hofer (2011) show that higher inventory 
efficiency is not necessarily indicative of superior inventory management. While some firms 
stand to improve their profitability by cutting inventory (i.e., improving efficiency), others may 
achieve a similar outcome by doing the exact opposite – i.e., holding more inventory (Eroglu and 
Hofer, 2011). Typically, firms benefit from efficiency enhancements if their initial position is 
one reflecting excess inventory (Runyantsev and Netessine, 2007). Such firms can reduce 
average inventory holdings and associated costs with barely any related negative impact on 
revenue generation. 
Interestingly, most firms tend to hold more inventory than they need to (Chen et al., 
2005). The preponderance of behavioral biases such as loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986) and the bracing bias (Tokar et al., 2014) provide a rationale for this generalized tendency 
to overstock. All else equal, inventory managers tend to view shortages as more problematic than 
overages (Lee and Siemsen, 2016). While a shortage is typically perceived as a pure loss, an 
overage is often downplayed as a mere inconvenience (Lee and Siemsen, 2016). This imbalanced 
sensitivity to shortages and overages causes managers to target higher-than-optimal service 
levels and induces them to hold more inventory than they need to (Lee and Siemsen, 2016). 




likelihood and magnitude of future demand shocks, with inflationary effects on inventory 
holdings (Tokar et al., 2014). They tend to brace themselves against the overestimated risk of 
shortage by carrying additional “just-in-case” inventory (Mishra et al., 2013, p. 300). 
With such a general bias towards overstocking, I expect efficiency enhancements to yield 
profitability gains for the typical firm – at least initially. This expectation is all the more 
plausible that efficiency improvements are often accompanied with or enabled by other systemic 
enhancements across the organization. For example, Lieberman and Demeester (1999) find that 
labor productivity improves when work-in-process inventory is reduced. Cachon and Fisher 
(2000) find the profitability benefits of inventory efficiency enhancements to be compounded by 
improvements to production scheduling and information sharing. 
As stated earlier, however, efficiency improvements are not exclusively beneficial to firm 
profitability. As much as they reduce inventory-related costs, they also increase the risk of 
shortage (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005) with a negative impact on revenue generation and firm 
profitability (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003). In addition, inventory-related costs typically decline 
linearly with each unit reduction in average inventory holdings whereas the risk of shortage 
increases exponentially (Rumyantsev and Netessine, 2007). As such, I expect incremental 
efficiency improvements to result in positive but declining marginal profitability gains. I 
therefore posit that: 
H1:  Inventory efficiency will be positively associated with firm profitability, but at a 
declining rate. 
Effectiveness (Supply Readiness) 
Firms are operationally effective to the extent that they provide a source of supply that 




2015). Inherently multidimensional, operational effectiveness encompasses indicators such as 
conformance quality, production flexibility, and fulfillment speed (Rosenzweig and Roth, 2004). 
In this study, I focus on the latter two indicators as key capabilities underlying a firm’s ability to 
readily meet customer demand – a concept that I henceforth call supply readiness. 
Supply readiness confers time-based competitive advantage (Stalk, 1988). It facilitates 
superior customer value creation through the fast conversion of customer orders into deliveries 
(Heim et al., 2014). In a business environment where the intrinsic attributes of most product 
offerings can be replicated relatively easily (Daugherty and Pittman, 1995), supply readiness 
stands as a meaningful differentiator in the marketplace. All else equal, customers typically favor 
suppliers with shorter lead-times (Heim et al., 2014). This is partly due to the substantial cost 
penalties that arise from transacting with less responsive suppliers. Stalk (1988) argues that long 
lead times require equally long forecast horizons, result in poorer forecast accuracy, exacerbate 
uncertainty, increase hedging costs (e.g., safety stock requirements), and induce organizational 
rigidity. As such, suppliers with greater leadtime compression capabilities tend to be in high 
demand and are often in a position to command premium pricing (Heim et al., 2014; Li and Lee, 
1994). Supply readiness is, therefore,  a valuable core competency that strengthens firm 
competitiveness, fosters customer loyalty, enhances market power, and facilitates market share 
gains (Tu et al., 2006) – with a positive impact on revenue generation and firm profitability.  
Supply readiness is, however, costly to develop. To support leadtime compression efforts, 
firms have to cultivate intra- and inter-organizational production flexibility capabilities 
commensurate with the level of supply readiness that they aim to achieve (Ketokivi, 2006). 
Depending on how wide a range of probable demand realizations a firm wants to accommodate, 




space, and slack time in the production schedule” may be needed (Gerwin, 1993, p. 406). 
Naturally, the more such investments a firm makes, the lower its marginal return due to the 
exponentially declining probability of extreme demand realizations.  As such, I posit that: 
H2: Supply readiness will be positively associated with firm profitability, but at a 
declining rate. 
Operational Ambidexterity 
While both efficiency and effectiveness have the potential to individually benefit firm 
profitability, many scholars argue that firms have grown significantly less constrained to pursue 
excellence in just one or the other (e.g., Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). Various technological 
advances have made the simultaneous enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness possible, 
with a compounding effect on the competencies’ profit impact (Heim and Peng, 2010).  
Mishra et al. (2013) suggest that information technology’s (IT) role in facilitating intra- 
and inter-organizational collaboration has enabled firms to reconcile efficiency and effectiveness 
in unprecedented ways. Programs such as electronic data interchange (EDI), vendor managed 
inventory (VMI), radio frequency identification (RFID), and collaborative planning, forecasting, 
and replenishment (CPFR) are examples of IT-enabled initiatives that facilitate such 
reconciliation. Advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT) are also credited with enabling the 
concurrent improvement of efficiency and effectiveness (Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). AMTs 
have, for example, helped propagate the practice of delayed product differentiation and mass 
customization. Also referred to as postponement, delayed product differentiation enables firms to 
enhance both inventory efficiency and supply readiness by using standard components across 
various product lines at early stages of the production process and leaving final customization till 




The principal benefit of these technological advances is not that they eliminate the 
tradeoff frontier but that they shift it in a way that gives firms an opportunity to design their 
operations for a wider range of combinations of efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Adler et al., 
1999; Hayes and Pisano, 1996; Rosenzweig and Easton, 2010). Over time, firms gradually 
internalize and leverage available technologies and best practices in an effort to progress towards 
the new tradeoff frontier (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As they do so, some put greater emphasis 
on efficiency (e.g., A0

A1 in Figure 1), while others prioritize effectiveness (e.g., A0

A2). 
Although these choices do not preclude the simultaneous improvement of efficiency and 
effectiveness the way a pure tradeoff scenario would, they reflect second-order tradeoffs – i.e., 
tradeoffs not between the competencies per se, but between the rates at which each competency 
is enhanced (Hayes and Pisano, 1996). 
 
As they internalize available technologies and best practices, I argue that firms that adjust 
their operations to maximize the combined levels of efficiency and effectiveness, rather than 
focusing on either in isolation, stand to achieve the greatest profitability gain. Since both 
competencies are subject to the law of diminishing returns (Schmenner and Swink, 1998) 




whereby exponentially larger investments are required to marginally enhance each, I argue that 
the fastest and most profitable trajectory to the tradeoff frontier is likely to be one where 
efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced concurrently rather than exclusively or sequentially. In 
other words, I argue that a concurrent one-unit improvement in each competency will be faster to 
achieve and more profitable than a two-unit improvement in either efficiency or effectiveness in 
isolation. 
Operational Ambidexterity is proposed as a construct that reflects a firm’s ability to 
approach that optimal combination of efficiency and effectiveness through the superior 
internalization and assimilation of available technologies and best practices. Note that maximal 
ambidexterity is not necessarily achieved by merely reaching the tradeoff frontier. Maximal 
ambidexterity is attained by positioning the firm at that unique equilibrium along the tradeoff 
frontier where a marginal enhancement in efficiency is offset by a resulting deterioration in 
effectiveness, or vice versa. Such equilibrium indicates that a firm has taken full advantage of the 
available technologies and best practices such that no further improvement is possible. I propose 
that the closer a firm gets to that perfect equilibrium, the more profitable it becomes. I, therefore, 
posit that: 
H3: Operational ambidexterity will be positively associated with firm profitability. That 





The study’s hypotheses are summarized in in Figure 21. 
 
Data and measurement 
To test the proposed hypotheses, a large panel dataset was compiled from Standard & 
Poor's COMPUSTAT database following the procedure outlined in Figure 3.  
 
                                                 
1 The joint effect corresponds to Operational Ambidexterity as discussed in Hypothesis 3. 
Manufacturing firms (NAICS 31-33) 
R&D-to-sales ratio ≤ 1  
Figure 3 – Sampling procedure 
Order Backlog <> N/A  
Inventory <> N/A  

















The initial sample consisted of all public manufacturing firms (i.e., NAICS codes 31-33) 
listed in the US between 2010 and 2015. I chose the manufacturing sector for the purpose of 
continuity with and comparability within the extant research on operations strategy, which 
happens to focus largely on the manufacturing sector (e.g., Boyer et al., 2005). The sampling 
period was chosen because it corresponds to the most recent time window that is long-enough for 
the purpose of this study and void of major exogenous shocks that could otherwise influence the 
relationships under investigation. I elected to start the sampling period in 2010 to avoid any 
confounding effects from the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  Judging by the US stock market’s 
performance, the US economy started to show the first signs of turnaround in the first semester 
of 2009, which marked the lowest post-crisis point of the S&P 500 index (Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille, 2011). From an initial sample of 3,408 firms and 15,986 firm-year observations, I 
proceeded to exclude firms that had an R&D-to-sales ratio greater than 1. Firms with such a high 
R&D intensity ratio tend to have negligible manufacturing operations and are typically viewed as 
research firms despite being classified as manufacturing firms in the COMPUSTAT database 
(e.g., Gentry and Shen, 2013). Excluding them from the analysis helps to limit undue effects on 
the relationships of interest in this study. I also erred on the side of conservatism by excluding 
observations with missing order backlog data (a key independent variable). An alternative 
approach could have been to replace missing data with zero values assuming that missing values 
reflect situations where backlogs are either negligible or indeed zero. This less conservative 
approach is sometimes used to treat missing R&D expenditure data (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012; 
Ortiz-Molina, 2006) but was deemed inadequate for this study. After this screening procedure, 
the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 595 firms totaling 2,758 firm-year 




Although the sample spans a wide range of manufacturing industries, it remains dominated by 
the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing and Machinery Manufacturing industries 
that collectively represent 61% of sampled firms. This skewed distribution is not by design. The 
skewness is reflective of the underlying population of public manufacturing firms in the 
COMPUSTAT universe as well as the uneven pervasiveness of backlogs across industries in the 
manufacturing sector. Order backlogs are most commonly seen in durable goods and computer 
manufacturing (Rajgopal et al., 2003), hence the relatively strong representation of those 
industries in the study’s sample. 
 
Dependent variable 









where Salesit and COGSit correspond respectively to annual revenues and cost of goods sold of 
firm i in year t.  
Gross margin is chosen over alternative measures of profitability commonly used in the 
literature because it is considered the purest indicator of a firm’s ability (or lack thereof) to 
capture value from operations through the proper leverage of efficiency and effectiveness as 
conceptualized in this study. Profit metrics that extend beyond gross margin (e.g., operating 
income, net income, etc.) account for discretionary items such as R&D expenditures and interest 
expenses that confound the true profit impact of a firm’s purely operational choices.  
Independent variables 
Inventory Efficiency (INVEFF) is measured using the following adaptation of inventory-
to-sales ratio were Invit refers to end-of-year inventory of firm i in year t: 




The adapted measure is chosen over the more commonly used inventory turns metric 
because it facilitates a more intuitive operationalization of the operational ambidexterity 
construct (discussed later) conceptualized as the interaction between inventory efficiency and 
supply readiness. I use (1 – inventory-to-sales) so that higher values of INVEFF reflect higher 
levels of efficiency. This facilitates the intuitive interpretability of results. 
Supply Readiness (READINESS), conceptualized as a firm’s ability to readily meet 









Backlogs are inversely related to a firm’s ability to readily meet customer demand as they 
represent customer orders that are booked but not filled by the end of a fiscal period – e.g., fiscal 
year (Rajgopal et al., 2003). Large backlogs suggest that an equally large portion of a firm’s total 
demand (i.e., Sales + Backlog) was not filled immediately upon order receipt. As such, larger 
backlogs are indicative of lower levels of supply readiness. 
Operational Ambidexterity (OPAMB) is operationalized as the interaction between 
inventory efficiency and supply readiness, in line with the commonly used multiplicative 
operationalization of organizational ambidexterity in the management literature (e.g., Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Cao et al., 2009). Operational Ambidexterity reflects a firm’s ability to take 
advantage of available technologies and operational best practices such that a superior level of 
combined efficiency (inventory efficiency) and effectiveness (supply readiness) is achieved. 
OPAMB is operationalized as follows: 




The simplified equation above shows that operational ambidexterity is enhanced as long 
as a reduction in inventory (i.e., higher efficiency) is accompanied by – at worst – a less than 
proportionate increase in backlogs (i.e., lower readiness), or a reduction in backlogs (i.e., higher 
readiness) is accompanied by – at worst – a less than proportionate increase in average inventory 
holdings (i.e., lower efficiency). 
Control variables 
I control for firm- and industry-level factors known to influence firm profitability. At the 
firm level, I include a log-transformation of firm total assets (ASSETit) as a means to account for 
the impact of firm size on firm financial performance (e.g., Eroglu and Hofer, 2011). I also 




focal firm engages in M&A activities during fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. Although most 
acquisitions account for no more than 5% of a firm’s total assets (Montgomery and Wilson, 
1986), they can at times constitute major transitional events that undermine the temporal 
comparability of firm accounting data (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011). Lastly, I control for 
firm market share (MKTSHAREit) for its impact on firm profitability (e.g., Szymanski et al., 
1993). 
At the industry level, I control for competitive intensity (COMPINTENSITYit) which I 
measure using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (e.g., Ramaswamy, 2001). Since HHI is 
often construed as an indicator of industry concentration and competitive structure (e.g., Barnett, 
1997), I include an additional rivalry-based control that captures the extent to which individual-
firm market shares vary from year to year. This competitive dynamics control 
(COMPINSTABILITYit) is measured using year-over-year absolute change in HHI per 6-digit 
NAICS code. 
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the entire sample as well as the top two 










Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
                    All Sample     
                 
Variable Obs. Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6  7  
1 . GM 2758    0.376    0.191  (4.677)      0.939 
       
2 . INVEFF 2758   0.815   0.122  (0.589)      0.999 0.189* 
      
3 . READINESS 2758   0.759   0.182    0.035      1.000 0.282* 0.243* 
     
4 . ASSET (in $bil.)† 2758   3.546 10.494  <0.001  113.481 -0.001
 
0.208* -0.152* 
    





   
6 . MKTSHARE 2758   0.169   0.287  <0.001      1.000 -0.185* 0.122* -0.074* 0.366* 0.076* 
  






8 . COMPINSTABILITY 2758      276     489 0.000     5,889 -0.046* -0.030  -0.046* -0.073* 0.000  0.035  0.151* 
Operational Ambidexterity is not included since it is operationalized as the interaction of INVEFF and READINESS. 
  
† Correlation coefficients based on log-transformed values of firm total assets for consistency with the empirical analysis. 
  









Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (Cont.) 
                    Computer & Electronic Product Manufacturing 
Variable Obs. Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6  7  
1 . GM 1170    0.441      .157    (0.250)      0.939
       
2 . INVEFF 1170    0.827     0.105      0.203      0.999 0.200* 
      
3 . READINESS 1170    0.781     0.161      0.172      1.000 0.267* 0.160* 
     
4 . ASSET (in $bil.)† 1170    2.863     9.057      0.001  113.481 0.087* 0.374* -0.077* 
    





   
6 . MKTSHARE 1170    0.060     0.155  <0.001      1.000 -0.064* 0.172* -0.062* 0.506* 0.086* 
  










8 . COMPINSTABILITY 1170       259        386 0.000     5,846 -0.008  0.019  0.015  -0.082* -0.018  0.007  0.371* 
                    Machinery Manufacturing 
Variable Obs. Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6  7  
1 . GM 534    0.351    0.148    (1.403)      0.698
       
2 . INVEFF 534    0.796     0.121   (0.537)      0.973 0.093* 
      
3 . READINESS 534    0.746     0.155      0.035      0.975 0.274* 0.217* 
     
4 . ASSET (in $bil.)† 534    4.044   10.938      0.001    89.356 0.071
 
0.260* 0.147* 
    





   
6 . MKTSHARE 534    0.201     0.280  <0.001      1.000 -0.068
 
0.156* 0.145* 0.368* 0.048
   










8 . COMPINSTABILITY 534       307        531 0.000     5,889 -0.132* -0.043  -0.174* -0.130* 0.029  0.095* 0.255* 
Operational Ambidexterity is not included since it is operationalized as the interaction of INVEFF and READINESS. 
  
† Correlation coefficients based on log-transformed values of firm total assets for consistency with the empirical analysis. 
  






Model specification and estimation 
Three hypotheses are proposed in this paper. The first two suggest that the respective 
effects of inventory efficiency and supply readiness (effectiveness) on firm gross margin will be 
positive and curvilinear with diminishing returns. One way to test for such effects is to perform a 
quadratic polynomial regression, and assess whether the linear and quadratic coefficients of 
inventory efficiency and supply readiness are statistically significant and positive and negative, 
respectively. The third hypothesis suggests that operational ambidexterity will be positively 
related to firm gross margin profitability. Support for this third hypothesis is ascertained if the 
coefficient of the interaction between Inventory Efficiency and Supply Readiness is positive and 
statistically significant. The following equation provides the mathematical formulation of the 
model, with Xit representing a vector of control variables: 
GM = μ + β%INVEFF + β&READINESS + β'INVEFF& +	β(READINESS& + β)OPAMB
+ δX + ε 
Given the panel structure of the dataset used in this study, determining the appropriate 
estimation procedure require that I first test for the presence of panel effects. To that end, I ran 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test, which assesses the null hypothesis that the 
variance across units (firms in this case) is zero. With a χ2 statistic equal to 2,137 (p-
value<0.0001), the BPLM test rejected the null – thus confirming the presence of panel effects 
and indicating that a simple OLS regression may not be appropriate due to a lack of 
independence among observations. I also ran a Wooldridge Lagrange Multiplier test for panel 





Besides panel effects and serial correlation, I also recognize the risk of omitted variable 
bias. Many unmeasured phenomena can influence the outcome of interest (firm profitability) 
beyond the independent variables included in the model. Failing to account for such phenomena 
can cause coefficient estimates to be biased. To mitigate that risk, I use fixed-effects modeling, 
which mean-centers the original data within each panel (firm in this case) then runs an ordinary-
least-squares estimation on the transformed dataset. This fixed effects procedure accounts for 
time-constant, unobserved heterogeneity across panels and significantly reduces the risk of 
omitted variable bias (Kennedy, 2003). Fixed effects models are also appropriate, unlike 
random-effects models, when the researcher is interested in estimating within-panel, short-run 
relationships (Kennedy, 2003) – as is the case in this study. I am particularly interested in 
understanding how a typical firm’s profitability evolves as a function of efficiency, effectiveness, 
and operational ambidexterity year over year – which corresponds to within (as opposed to 
between) variance.  
Results 
Table 2 provides the study’s empirical results at different levels of granularity. Panels A 
show aggregate, sector-level results for the entire sample. Panels B and C provide more granular, 
industry-level results for the two most represented industries in the sample: Computer and 
Electronic Product Manufacturing and Machinery Manufacturing, respectively. All results are 





Table 2 - Estimation Results; DV = Firm Gross Margin 
Variables 
All Sample 
A1 A2 A3 
INVEFF 0.388 *** 0.493 *** -0.013 
(0.034) (0.060) (0.077) 
READINESS -0.045 0.264 * -0.142 
(0.035) (0.144) (0.146) 
INVEFF^2 -0.125 ** -0.247 *** 
(0.053) (0.053) 
READINESS^2 -0.232 ** -0.520 *** 
(0.108) (0.109) 
OPAMB 1.036 *** 
(0.102) 
ASSET 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.035 *** 














(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 






(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 






(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
Intercept -0.154 ** -0.249 *** 0.110 
 
  (0.060) (0.071) (0.078) 
R2 0.06   0.07   0.11   
F-statistic 20.87 *** 17.54 *** 26.91 *** 
# of Observations 2758 2758 2758 
# of Firms  595   595   595   
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 





Table 2 - Estimation Results; DV = Firm Gross Margin (Cont.) 
Variables 
Computer & Electronic Product Mfg 
B1 B2 B3 
INVEFF 0.206 *** 0.178 0.187 
(0.028) (0.123) (0.124) 
READINESS -0.100 *** -0.012 0.012 
(0.024) (0.106) (0.113) 
INVEFF^2 0.018 0.044 
(0.089) (0.099) 




ASSET 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 














(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 






(0.028) (0.021) (0.021) 






(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Intercept 0.177 *** 0.160 *** 0.147 ** 
  (0.042) (0.060) (0.064) 
R2 0.08   0.08   0.08   
F-statistic 11.36 *** 8.90 *** 8.04 *** 
# of Observations 1170 1170 1170 
# of Firms  256   256   256   
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 





Table 2 - Estimation Results; DV = Firm Gross Margin (Cont.) 
Variables 
Machinery Mfg 
C1 C2 C3 
INVEFF 0.241 *** -0.219 *** -0.271 *** 
(0.046) (0.066) (0.067) 
READINESS 0.067 1.837 *** 1.659 *** 
(0.056) (0.218) (0.222) 
INVEFF^2 0.381 *** -0.024 
(0.060) (0.134) 
READINESS^2 -1.310 *** -1.634 *** 
(0.154) (0.180) 
OPAMB 0.890 *** 
(0.264) 
ASSET 0.033 *** 0.038 *** 0.032 *** 














(0.065) (0.058) (0.057) 






(0.053) (0.048) (0.048) 






(0.094) (0.050) (0.049) 
Intercept -0.077 
 
-0.549 *** -0.423 *** 
  (0.094) (0.102) (0.107) 
R2 0.10   0.28   0.29   
F-statistic 6.43 *** 17.51 *** 17.29 *** 
# of Observations 534 534 534 
# of Firms  110   110   110   
Standard errors between parentheses; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
† Coefficient estimates multiplied by 10,000 to facilitate readability. 
 










1 Inv. Efficiency (∩) Supported Partially Supported Partially Supported 
2 Supp. Readiness (∩) Supported n.s Supported 




Hypothesis 1: Inventory Efficiency and Gross Margin Profitability 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that inventory efficiency would have a positive effect on firm 
profitability but with diminishing returns. Results from panels A1 and A2 provide support for the 
hypothesized relationship at the sector level. The coefficient estimate of inventory efficiency is 
positive and statistically significant (β1=0.388; p-value<0.001), and that of the associated 
quadratic term is significantly negative (β3=-0.125; p-value=0.019). Results at the industry-level 
are slightly more nuanced. For the computer and electronic product manufacturing industry, 
results show that the effect of efficiency on firm gross margin profitability is indeed positive 
(β1=0.206; p-value<0.001). However, no evidence for a curvilinear relationship is found 
(β3=0.018; p-value=0.838). Inventory efficiency appears to have a strictly linear effect on firm 
profitability, thus providing partial support for H1. In the machinery manufacturing industry, 
panels C1 and C2 show inventory efficiency to have a positive and strengthening effect on gross 
margin profitability as evidenced by the coefficients of the linear (β1=0.241; p-value<0.001) and 
quadratic inventory efficiency terms (β3=0.381; p-value<0.001). This goes partially counter to 
the hypothesized relationship, which proposed a positive but declining profit impact. H1 is, 
therefore, only partially supported for the machinery manufacturing industry. 
Hypothesis 2: Supply Readiness and Gross Margin Profitability 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that supply readiness (an indicator of operational effectiveness) 
would have a positive curvilinear effect with diminishing returns on firm profitability. Results 
from panels A1 and A2 provide support for the hypothesized relationship at the sector level as 
evidenced by the positive and negative coefficient estimates of supply readiness for the linear 
(β2=0.264; p-value=0.067) and quadratic (β4=-0.232; p-value=0.032) terms, respectively. The 




industry (cf. panel B1). Manufacturers in this industry tend to have strictly negative returns to 
improvements in supply readiness (β2=-0.1; p-value<0.001). This is somewhat surprising given 
the industry’s fast-paced, hyper-competitive environment where one would expect rapid 
customer order fulfillment to provide a significant competitive edge. At the same time, one could 
speculatively rationalize the surprising finding based on the possible cost penalty of having 
obsolescence-prone slack capacity. Lastly, the hypothesis is supported for the machinery 
manufacturing industry judging by the coefficient estimates of the linear (β2=1.837; p-
value<0.001) and quadratic (β4=-1.31; p-value<0.001) terms of supply readiness. 
Hypothesis 3: Operational Ambidexterity and Gross Margin Profitability 
Hypothesis 3 suggested that operational ambidexterity (i.e., a firm’s ability to enhance 
both inventory efficiency and supply readiness concurrently) would have a positive effect on 
firm profitability. Empirical results show the hypothesized relationship to be supported at the 
sector level, as evidenced by a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate of 
operational ambidexterity in panel A3 (β5=1.036; p-value<0.001). This sample-wide result is, 
however, not confirmed for the computer and electronic product manufacturing industry       
(β5=-0.067; p-value=0.546). While the finding fails to provide support for the cumulative 
perspective in this specific industry, it does not offer support for the tradeoff perspective either. 
It shows, together with results from panel B1, that computer and electronic product 
manufacturers tend to be penalized for enhancing supply readiness – whether that is undertaken 
in isolation or in conjunction with concomitant improvements to inventory efficiency. In 
contrast, machinery manufacturers are shown to significantly benefit from the simultaneous 
improvement of efficiency and effectiveness, in line with results from the manufacturing sector 




firms can, to a large extent, successfully reconcile efficiency and effectiveness (r=0.243; p-
value<0.001) with a positive compounded impact on firm gross margin profitability. Table 3 
provides a summary of all hypothesis-testing results. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This research explored the inner dynamics of operational excellence by investigating the 
individual and collective effects of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness on firm 
profitability. In so doing, it assessed the respective merits of two major perspectives in 
operations strategy: the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives. Whereas the former views 
efficiency and effectiveness as mutually exclusive and, thus, difficult to enhance simultaneously 
(Skinner, 1969); the latter considers the two competencies to be mutually supportive and 
amenable to concurrent improvements – implying that the tradeoff perspective may be premised 
on a false dichotomy (Ferdows and De Meyer, 1990; Blackburn and Scudder, 2009). 
The study’s main thrust was to determine which of the two perspectives held a higher 
promise. To that end, I drew on Porter’s (1980) profit maximization prescription suggesting that 
the pertinence of a firm’s operations strategy is not determined by whether the strategy facilitates 
excellence in efficiency, effectiveness, or both; but by the extent to which the operational 
achievements that it facilitates translate into firm profitability. Within this profit maximization 
framework, the tradeoff perspective would be superior if efficiency and effectiveness had an 
uncapped profit potential individually, but a negative profit impact collectively. The cumulative 
perspective, on the other hand, would be superior if concurrent enhancements of efficiency and 
effectiveness (i.e., operational ambidexterity) had a positive impact on firm profitability. 
Because of the relative dominance of two industries in the sample, empirical analyses 




manufacturing sector, as sampled) and at the industry level for the dominating industries – 
computer and electronic product manufacturing and machinery manufacturing.  
At the sector level, empirical results clearly indicated the superiority of the cumulative 
perspective. The individual effects of efficiency and effectiveness on firm profitability were 
found to be positive and curvilinear with diminishing returns. In other words, individual 
enhancements to either competency in isolation tended to improve firm profitability only up to a 
point. Beyond that point further improvements resulted in negative marginal returns. For 
example, the marginal profitability benefit of supply readiness (a key indicator of effectiveness) 
was found to be positive up to a score of 0.571 (for a sample range of 0.035 to 1) and 
increasingly negative beyond that point. As per the profit impact of concurrent enhancements in 
efficiency and effectiveness, empirical results provided evidence for a synergistic effect of 
operational ambidexterity, thus lending support to the cumulative perspective over the tradeoff 
model. 
At the industry level, results were noticeably more nuanced. Evidence from the computer 
and electronic product manufacturing industry showed no support for either the tradeoff model 
or the cumulative perspective, as operational ambidexterity had no significant impact on firm 
profitability. Individually, however, inventory efficiency had a strictly linear positive effect on 
profitability while supply readiness had a strictly negative impact. As mentioned earlier, this 
result was surprising but not implausible. The computer and electronic product manufacturing 
industry is notorious for its rapid technological progress and inordinate risk of obsolescence. In 
such an environment, a lack of efficiency is likely to translate into frequent and substantial write-
offs with material negative effects on firm profitability. Heavy investments in infrastructure that 




that the infrastructure remains relevant long enough for there to be a satisfactory return on 
investment. For example, when technologically more advanced offerings from the competition 
caused Sony’s sales in the personal computer market to fall short of projections in 2013, the 
company had to write inventory down by more than $300 million with a substantial negative 
impact on profitability (Tabuchi, 2014). The company had to also revamp its supply readiness 
infrastructure to better synchronize its operations with changing market dynamics, with an even 
greater loss in profitability. Form an initial projection of an annual profit of $500 million, the 
company revised its outlook to a loss of $1.3 billion (Tabuchi, 2014). 
Empirical results from the machinery manufacturing industry, on the other hand, 
provided support for the cumulative perspective, in line with sector-level findings. Operational 
ambidexterity was found to offer synergistic benefits as indicated by the compounded positive 
impact of concurrent improvements in inventory efficiency and supply readiness on firm 
profitability. 
The present study contributes to the operations strategy literature in several ways. First, it 
reinforces the cumulative perspective’s proposition that firms can indeed profitably enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously. This is of particular significance given that most 
firms still design their operations for focused excellence in either efficiency or effectiveness on 
the premise that “few unfocused factories outperform competitors” (Brumme et al., 2015, p. 
1513). At the same time, the study shows that all industries do not benefit from operational 
ambidexterity in the same fashion, if at all. For example, firm profitability in the computer and 
electronic product manufacturing industry is not impacted by operational ambidexterity, neither 
positively nor negatively. This nuanced finding – relative to the strong support for ambidexterity 




such as competitive dynamics and average product lifecycle may act as salient contingencies 
affecting the differential pertinence of the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives, respectively. 
Future research may explore this possibility at a more granular level. 
Second, the study goes beyond the traditional question of feasibility addressed by most of 
the relevant literature; it provides a performance-based assessment of operational ambidexterity. 
Prior research had mostly been concerned with the face validity of ambidexterity as an 
evolutionary practice from the more traditional tradeoff approach, with only minimal attention 
given to the practice’s profit impact. While that provides valuable insights and helps to evaluate 
the appeal and potential adoption of the cumulative perspective, it may not be effective in 
establishing the perspective’s pertinence – at least not as much as providing evidence for a 
significant profit impact would.  
Third, it answers Rosenzweig and Easton’s (2010) call for a longitudinal perspective to 
the study of tradeoffs (or lack thereof) in operations strategy. It also answers the same authors’ 
call for research that uses objective measures of efficiency and effectiveness as an alternative to 
the more commonly used self-report, perception-based approach.  
From a managerial perspective, the evidence provided for a positive impact of 
operational ambidexterity on firm profitability has the potential to shift mindsets and encourage a 
more encompassing approach to strategy formulation in operations management. The study’s 
findings, in conjunction with prior research highlighting the conceptual appeal of the cumulative 
perspective, are likely to spur more initiatives aimed at reconciling efficiency and effectiveness 
for enhanced firm profitability. In addition to the strategy formulation implications, the proposed 
measurement for operational ambidexterity provides a simple and easy-to-use metric that can 




reconcile efficiency and effectiveness with industry benchmarks as well as against the firm’s 
own historical realizations. 
Besides the abovementioned contributions, this study has a few limitations that could be 
alleviated in future research. First, by using a backlog-based operationalization of supply 
readiness, the study de facto overlooks manufacturing industries where backlogs are not common 
practice. This limitation reduces the generalizability of findings to industries beyond the ones 
considered in the study. Future research may consider alternate measures of supply readiness that 
would enable a more comprehensive sampling for stronger external validity. Second, the 
research addresses the tradeoff and cumulative perspectives based on inventory efficiency and 
supply readiness as key indicators of operational efficiency and operational effectiveness. As 
discussed, there are other indicators of efficiency and effectiveness such as conformance quality 
and production efficiency that the study does not investigate. Future research may look into 
tradeoffs among other indicators to augment the findings of this study and further enhance our 
understanding of the merits of operations strategy’s tradeoff and cumulative perspectives 
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III. Essay 2 – Operational excellence and long-term value creation: A stock market 
perspective on the productivity dilemma  
 
Abstract 
Operational excellence is sometimes viewed as inherently incompatible with long-term 
value creation. The productivity dilemma literature, in particular, views operational excellence 
unfavorably; firms with a pronounced emphasis on operational excellence are said to be too 
short-term oriented and at risk of trading long-term viability for short-term profitability. 
Empirical evidence from the operations and finance literatures, however, suggests that 
operational excellence may facilitate internal cash-flow generation – which, in turn, is an 
effective financing instrument for firm growth and long-term value creation. In light of these 
contrasting views and findings, this research revisits the relationship between operational 
excellence and long-term value creation. Adopting a stock market perspective and drawing on 
signaling theory, I argue that stock market participants will view operational excellence as a 
positive signal for value creation in the long term. In light of propositions from the productivity 
dilemma literature, I hypothesize that this effect is contingent on two factors: the stock market’s 
expectation of firm short-term revenue growth and the firm’s research and development efforts. 
Short-term revenue growth expectations are suggested to have a dampening effect on the stock 
market’s anticipation of long-term value, whereas firm R&D efforts are expected to strengthen 
the market’s positive outlook. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of 864 publicly 
traded US manufacturing firms over the 2010-2015 period, and the results provide support for 





Process management practices such as Just-In-Time and Total Quality Management are 
usually leveraged to streamline day-to-day operations for consistency and process reliability 
(Ding, 2015). When properly implemented, they facilitate the achievement of operational 
excellence (Kaplan and Norton, 2008) – i.e., a core competency reflecting a firm’s ability to 
efficiently, effectively, and profitably run its day-to-day operations (Treacy and Wiersema, 
1993). Operational excellence is in that sense a short-term performance benefit of properly 
implemented process management practices and a potent enabler of firm competitive advantage 
(Kaplan and Norton, 2008; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). 
It has been suggested, however, that the benefits of process management practices can be 
ephemeral and at odds with strategic flexibility and long-term value creation (Adler et al., 2009). 
The productivity dilemma literature, in particular, suggests that firms with a pronounced 
emphasis on process management are at risk of growing too entrenched in a narrowly defined 
modus operandi and, thus, become vulnerable to changing market conditions (Benner and 
Tushman, 2003). Proponents of this line of thought portray process management practices as a 
double-edged sword with opposing short- and long-term effects on firm performance. As much 
as they praise the practices for enabling the “consistent execution” (Adler et al., 2009, p.99) of 
firm strategy in the short term, they warn that the practices “can also hinder learning and 
innovation, leaving organizations rigid and inflexible” in the long term (Adler et al., 2009, p.99). 
In a sense, the productivity dilemma literature suggests that there is a tradeoff between short-





Although compelling in many ways, the productivity dilemma argument stands in stark 
contrast with abounding anecdotal evidence of organizations successfully leveraging process 
management practices to propel themselves to the forefront of their respective industries. 
Companies such as Toyota and Walmart explicitly attribute most of their long-standing success 
to their ability to achieve operational excellence through the proper implementation of superior 
process management practices. Toyota’s continuous-improvement philosophy has earned the 
company the title of world’s greatest manufacturer many times over (Liker and Franz, 2011), and 
Walmart’s superior logistics and process management practices have enabled the company to 
dominate the retail industry for decades (Miller, 2014). Indeed, in an interview with CNBC, 
Walmart CEO Doug McMillon said that process-management-driven operational excellence 
spurs productivity in the short term and provides necessary cash to finance expansion plans and 
enable long-term shareholder value creation (CNBC, 2015). 
In line with these anecdotal observations, empirical evidence from the finance and 
operations management literatures appears to collectively indicate that the proper 
implementation of process management practices may, in fact, facilitate rather than obstruct firm 
growth and long-term value creation. Research in operations management has linked process 
management practices to firm cash-flow generation (Fullerton et al., 2003), and the finance 
literature has shown internal cash-flow generation to serve as the primary financing instrument 
for firm expansion plans and long-term growth (Myers, 1984; Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). All in 
all, these anecdotal and empirical observations invite the conjecture that properly implemented 





This research assesses the validity of that conjecture by investigating the extent to which 
a firm’s successful implementation of process management practices, as reflected in the firm’s 
achieved operational excellence, signals long-term value creation as anticipated by the stock 
market. Value is herein construed from the shareholder’s perspective in accordance with the 
view that shareholder value maximization is the most encompassing indicator of long-term value 
creation (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004); maximizing shareholder value is said to “implicitly 
provide a mechanism to reach a proper balance between the conflicting objectives of the various 
stakeholders of a firm” (Klibi et al., 2010, p.286). Firm market value is, therefore, used as an 
indicator of long-term shareholder value creation (e.g., Lavie et al., 2011).  
Drawing on signaling theory (Spence, 1973), I argue that the investment community will 
– contrary to the productivity dilemma narrative – view operational excellence as a positive 
signal for long-term shareholder value creation. This positive assessment is, however, 
hypothesized to be contextual and contingent on two market- and firm-level factors: (1) the stock 
market’s expectation of firm short-term revenue growth and (2) the firm’s R&D efforts. Firm 
short-term revenue growth expectations are suggested to have a dampening effect on the stock 
market’s assessment of the long-term value creation potential of operational excellence, whereas 
firm R&D efforts are hypothesized to strengthen the stock market’s positive outlook.  
This research departs from and augments the extant literature in two major ways (cf. 
Figure 1). First, it focuses on achieved operational excellence as the antecedent of interest 
driving long-term value creation. Most of the existing literature links process management 
practices such as Total Quality Management (e.g., Powell, 1995), Just-In-Time (e.g., Fullerton et 
al., 2003), and Six Sigma (e.g., Shafer and Moeller, 2012) to long-term value creation without 




contribute valuable insights and advance our understanding of the strategic value of process 
management, they leave room for implementation-related confounds. Two firms implementing 
the same process management practices may not necessarily achieve the same level of 
operational excellence due to possible differences in implementation effectiveness. Studies that 
do not account for such differences de facto assume that process management practices 
invariably and uniformly lead to operational excellence across firms and contexts irrespective of 
how effectively (or not) the practices are implemented. By measuring achieved operational 
excellence (instead of assuming it) and using it as the antecedent of interest, this research 
effectively eliminates the risk of implementation-related confounds and isolates the effect of 





The second way this research departs from and augments the extant literature is by 
relying on the stock market’s ex-ante assessment of long-term value creation. This is again 
motivated by a concern about confounding effects. Previous studies have mostly measured long-
term value creation using ex-post assessments (Hendricks and Singhal, 2001a; Modi and Mishra, 




2011; Benner and Tushman, 2002). The most common ex-post assessment consists in measuring 
performance outcomes three to five years after some process management practices are 
implemented (e.g., Powell, 1995; Douglas and Judge, 2001; Shah and Ward, 2003). While these 
assessments can be practically appealing, the substantial temporal separation between the trigger 
event (e.g., implementation of process management practices) and the presumed long-term 
outcome (e.g., value creation) makes it difficult to unambiguously establish causality. A 
multitude of events, both exogenous and endogenous (e.g., new competitive landscape, change 
of management), could occur at any time during the three to five year window separating the 
observation of the trigger and the measurement of the outcome. Such unaccounted-for events 
could have material effects on the presumed outcome, thus confounding the relationship of 
interest. To work around this risk of confounding events, I use the stock market’s ex-ante 
assessment of firm future cash flows into infinity as a means to measure anticipated LTVC (e.g., 
Hillman and Keim, 2001). This approach, premised on the efficient markets hypothesis that 
views markets as collectively efficient and effective in evaluating the cash-flow generation 
potential of public firms (Fama, 1998), has been shown to reasonably approximate ex-post 
realizations (e.g., Kale et al., 2012). 
This research contributes to theory and practice in several ways. First, it advances our 
understanding of the strategic value of properly implemented process management practices by 
examining the LTVC potential of operational excellence. Second, it helps top managers reduce 
the risk of suboptimal strategy formulation by providing boundary conditions to the long-term 
benefits of operational excellence in the form of two contingency factors – firm short-term 




top executives continue to aggressively pursue process management and associated operational 
excellence despite numerous warnings from the productivity dilemma literature. 
Background and hypotheses 
Despite a strong indictment from the conceptual productivity dilemma literature, 
empirical research addressing the long-term value creation potential of process management 
practices and associated operational excellence remains surprisingly sparse. While numerous 
studies have addressed and documented the practices’ various short-term benefits (e.g., Anand et 
al., 2010; Tatikonda et al., 2013), few have examined the corresponding long-term effects – 
achieved, perceived, or anticipated. With a relative emphasis on the impact of practices such as 
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just-In-Time (JIT), empirical findings are relatively 
dated and remain collectively inconclusive. Using self-reported perceptual measures of firm 
performance, Powell (1995) and Samson and Terziovski (1999) found no evidence that TQM 
helps create value three years post implementation. In contrast, Douglas and Judge (2001) found 
evidence of a strong positive relationship over the same timeframe using the same perceptual 
measures. Similar conflicting findings are also reported by studies using objective measures of 
LTVC. Whereas Easton and Jarrell (1998) claim strong positive value-creation effects three to 
five years post implementation, Staw and Epstein (2000) find no such evidence. 
A potential reason for the inconsistent results in prior research could be that the 
performance benefits of process management practice were studied without ascertaining 
implementation effectiveness (York and Miree, 2004). To remedy this possible weakness, 
Hendricks and Singhal (2001b) focused on firms that have been recognized – through quality 
awards – for their effective implementation of process management practices. Investigating long-




to significantly outperform non-winners on the stock market up to five years post recognition. 
However, York and Miree (2004) expressed concern over the adequacy of using quality awards 
as a proxy for implementation effectiveness, arguing that different quality awards have different 
“criteria, standards, and levels of competition” (p. 294) and may not be consistent means of 
ascertaining implementation effectiveness. 
In light of the literature’s conflicting findings and the concern raised by York and Miree 
(2004), this research revisits the relationship between properly implemented process 
management practices and long-term value creation. Achieved operational excellence is used as 
an objective indicator of proper implementation and is linked to LTVC as anticipated by the 
stock market. By focusing on achieved operational excellence as the antecedent of interest, this 
research aims to establish a confound-free link between the proper implementation of process 
management practices and LTVC. 
Drawing on signaling theory (Spence, 1973), this research is premised on the idea that 
operational excellence information embedded in a firm’s financial statements and accompanying 
notes will act as an objective signal that the investment community can use to make inferences 
about the firm’s LTVC prospects. Despite their focus on past realizations, financial statements 
are widely referred to by market participants as signal-carrying media from which insights into 
the strategic orientation and LTVC potential of corporations can be gleaned (Ou and Penman, 
1989). It is expected that the stock market will, in accordance with the efficient markets 
hypothesis2, adjust its assessment of firm LTVC prospects as new operational excellence signals 
become available.  
                                                 
2 The efficient market hypothesis stipulates that stock market participants are collectively 





Introduced by Michael Spence (1973), signaling theory suggests that markets are often 
characterized by incomplete and asymmetrically located information. In most transactions, one 
party – the insider – may privately hold pertinent information without which the other party – the 
outsider – may inadequately assess the underlying value of the object of the transaction 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Two types of information are of particular interest in this case: 
information about quality and information about intent (Stiglitz, 2000). The first pertains to 
characteristics of the object of the transaction whereas the second relates to the behavior and 
behavioral intentions of the insider (Connelly et al., 2011). An outsider that lacks full knowledge 
of either quality or intent is expected to seek observable and alterable characteristics that 
reasonably qualify the object of the transaction and give an indication of the insider’s intent 
(Bergh and Gibbons, 2010; Certo, 2003). Such characteristics are called signals (Spence, 2002) 
and are meant to reduce the outsider’s informational disadvantage and increase the accuracy of 
his/her assessment of the transaction at hand. 
According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973), signals have to meet two conditions to be 
effective. First, they must be sufficiently costly to the signaler (Bergh and Gibbons, 2010) such 
that they can neither be obtained without merit nor be fabricated without a prohibitively high 
opportunity cost to the signaler (Connelly et al., 2011). Second, they must be deemed by the 
receiver – i.e., the outsider – as having high information value about quality and intent (Bergh 
and Gibbons, 2010). The information content of financial statements meets both conditions. 
First, the format, content, and reporting requirements of financial statements are regulated by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and strictly monitored by the Securities and 
                                                                                                                                                             
information (Womack, 1996) to effectively assess the long-term value creation potential of 




Exchange Commission (SEC) with the clear purpose to make reported financial information as 
reflective of the true financial health and performance of corporations as possible (Beaver et al., 
2005). The institution of internal audit committees and the requirement that financial statements 
of public corporations be reviewed and validated by independent external auditors are just two 
measures, among many, that make signaling through financial statements costly to corporate 
managers and difficult to fabricate (Xie et al., 2003). Second, financial statements are widely 
perceived by market participants as a valuable source of information on the underlying quality 
and value creation potential of public corporations (Ou and Penman, 1989; Frankel and Li, 
2004). 
Operational excellence and long-term value creation 
Operational excellence signals a firm’s ability to efficiently, effectively, and profitably3 
fulfill its competitive strategy (Adam and Samidass, 1989; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). A 
short-term performance outcome of the proper implementation of process management practices 
(Treacy and Wiersema, 1993), operational excellence is often viewed as a strong indicator of 
superior executional capabilities (Kaplan and Norton, 2008). 
The ability to properly execute firm strategy is as a major source of competitive 
advantage (Kaplan and Norton, 2008) and a substantial facilitator of shareholder value creation. 
Porter (1979) observes that superior executional capabilities enable above-average returns and 
create superior shareholder value. Knott (2003) offers empirical evidence corroborating Porter’s 
                                                 
3 Efficiency refers to a firm’s ability to generate more output per unit of input or use less input 
per unit of output, relative to peers; the greater the output to input ratio, the more efficient the 
firm is (Priem and Butler, 2001). Effectiveness reflects the ability of a firm to use scarce 
resources to fulfill its market promise (Heikkila, 2002). On-time delivery and order fulfillment 
accuracy are examples of indicators of operational effectiveness. Operating profitability indicates 
a firm’s ability to capture value from sales proceeds after accounting for the cost of operating 




observation; she shows that franchised establishments – known for their routinized processes and 
superior executional capabilities – generate 50% higher total returns than independently run 
peers (Knott, 2003). 
Operational excellence is also positively associated with revenue generation (Reed et al., 
1996). Firms with proven records of operational excellence signal dependability and invite 
stronger business ties with potential partners (Shin et al., 2000). In an environment where supply 
chain disruptions can be extremely costly (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003), firms with a proven 
ability to provide a reliable source of supply are in high demand (Wang et al., 2010). Such firms 
reduce client exposure to supply uncertainty and offer transaction-cost advantages over the 
competition (Williamson, 1981). As such, they are likely to enjoy stronger and longer-lasting 
business ties that are conducive to more stable and sustainable revenue streams (Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995). Operational excellence is, therefore, expected to be viewed as a signal for 
LTVC through enhanced revenue generation.  
The positive impact on revenue generation, coupled with a well-documented effect on 
cost containment and waste elimination (e.g., Browning and Heath, 2009), makes operational 
excellence an effective free-cash-flow generation instrument and an ideal enabler of firm growth 
and LTVC. Short-term cash flow generation has been identified as the most effective facilitator 
of long-term expansion plans. Myers’ (1984) seminal study on the capital structure of 
corporations found that 62% of all capital expenditures of non-financial US corporations from 
1973 to 1982 were financed with internally generated cash. The study’s finding – more recently 
confirmed in a study over the period 1962-2009 (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013) – implies that 





Lastly, operational excellence is a versatile competency that can be leveraged to initiate 
forays into new markets (Markman et al., 2009). Many routinized processes lend themselves to 
be implemented across markets and industries, enabling companies to achieve economies of 
scope and LTVC (Wernerfelt, 1984). For example, Amazon’s operational excellence has enabled 
the company to break down industry barriers in unprecedented ways. Starting as an online 
bookstore, the company leveraged the versatility of its operational routines and processes to 
expand into an extensive list of new product categories and create above-average long-term 
shareholder value as a result.  
H1: Achieved operational excellence will be positively associated with anticipated long-
term value creation. 
The moderating effect of short-term revenue growth expectations 
A central element in the productivity dilemma literature is its focus on growth 
opportunities as the upside potential at risk of being sacrificed in the pursuit of operational 
excellence (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Growth is, in fact, portrayed as an opportunity cost in a 
sense that firms that are heavily focused on achieving operational excellence may fail to take 
advantage of available growth opportunities. Such firms are said to be process-management-
driven and focused on perfecting their current modus operandi in a rather inward-looking fashion 
(Adler et al., 2009). As such, they are criticized for being at risk of growing so focused on 
process mapping, improvement, and control that they become too rigid to recognize, let alone 
seize growth opportunities as and when they arise (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Assuming that 
is true, one could then contend that firms with different growth prospects will have different 
growth-related opportunity costs and, thus, different long-term downsides to operational 




opportunity cost. Accordingly, stock market participants are likely to interpret a firm’s 
operational excellence signal differently depending on their expectations of the firm’s short-term 
revenue growth. 
When growth expectations are high, the stock market will be less eager to reward 
operational excellence than it would revenue growth. Operational excellence may, in fact, be 
viewed as a hindrance to growth. A firm that scores high on operational excellence may be 
viewed as favoring margin preservation over market share gains, and forgoing growth 
opportunities in the process. In the same vein, operational excellence could be viewed as a 
reflection of excessively lean operations (Eroglu and Hofer, 2011) that may translate into lost 
sales in the immediate term, with negative long-term ripple effects on customer loyalty and 
future revenue generation (Moussaoui et al., 2016). Conversely, low operational excellence 
under conditions of high revenue growth expectations may be tolerated on the premise that a lack 
of short-term efficiency and operating profitability can be justified by the firm’s pursuit of 
growth opportunities and long-term value creation. 
H2: Stock market expectations of short-term firm revenue growth will negatively 
moderate the relationship between achieved operational excellence and anticipated long-
term value creation. 
The moderating effect of firm R&D efforts 
The productivity dilemma argument suggests that firms pursuing operational excellence 
may achieve efficiency, effectiveness, and operating profitability in the short term, but may also 
grow too rigid to adapt to changing market conditions in the long term (Adler et al., 2009). 




cause firms to overcommit to modi operandi that gradually lose relevance as markets evolve 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003; Wagner et al., 2012).  
Firms that engage in R&D efforts are better positioned to mitigate that risk of rigidity and 
gradual obsolescence. R&D efforts are means of experimentation that ensure a steady flow of 
new ideas into the organization (March, 1991). Research on organizational change and 
adaptation suggests that R&D efforts enable organizations to enrich their knowledge pool and 
stay current on relevant market developments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 
2002) with a positive impact on strategic adaptability (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). 
From a signaling perspective, firms that engage in R&D efforts while achieving high 
operational excellence show ambidextrous capabilities likely to be perceived by the stock market 
as positive signals for long-term value creation. Stock-market participants are fully aware of the 
dual exploitation-exploration mandate of organizations (Lavie et al., 2011; Stein, 1989). They are 
particularly attentive and responsive to signals of firm exploration (or lack thereof). Woolridge 
and Snow (1990) show a strong positive relationship between a firm’s strategic R&D efforts and 
its stock market valuation. Similarly, Stein (1989) shows the stock market to be efficient in 
detecting signals of an overemphasis on short-term outcomes – such as operational excellence – 
at the expense of exploratory efforts – such as R&D – meant to enhance the odds of sustained 
long-term value creation. Firms that achieve short-term profitability by cutting discretionary 
R&D expenditures are viewed by market participants as jeopardizing long-term value creation 
and are penalized accordingly (Gentry and Shen, 2013; Stein, 1990). Conversely, firms that 
engage in exploration through R&D efforts while showing a strong ability to run their day-to-day 
operations efficiently, effectively, and profitably are viewed as ambidextrous and more 




H3: Firm R&D efforts will positively moderate the relationship between achieved 
operational excellence and anticipated long-term value creation. 
Data and measurement 
To test the proposed hypotheses, a panel data set was compiled following the procedure 
outlined in Figure 2. The initial sample consisted of all publicly traded manufacturing firms (i.e., 
NAICS codes 31-33) listed on the NYSE, NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), or NASDAQ 
exchanges between 2010 and 2015. This time period corresponds to the most recent window that 
is long-enough for the purpose of this study and void of major exogenous shocks (e.g., the 2008 
financial crisis) that could otherwise influence the relationships under investigation. From an 
initial sample of 2,353 firms and 11,707 firm-year observations, I proceeded to exclude firms 
with particularly high R&D expenditures, low market capitalizations and limited analyst 
coverage: the rationale behind the exclusion of firms with R&D expenditures greater than sales is 
that firms with such a high R&D intensity tend to be research firms with limited manufacturing 
operations (e.g., Gentry and Shen, 2013). Firms with market capitalizations of less than $300 
million (often referred to as micro and nano caps) or average annual sales of less than $10 
million were removed from consideration since such small firms are often subject to infrequent 
and/or speculative trading that distorts their market values (e.g., Kim and Bettis, 2014). Lastly, I 
excluded firms that are followed by fewer than five analysts, as is common in similar studies 
(e.g., Loh and Mian, 2006; Mikhail et al., 1999). Greater analyst coverage ensures investor 
scrutiny and strengthens signal-based assessment models as it facilitates the faster dissemination 
and assimilation of firm financial signals (Hong et al., 2000). After this screening procedure and 
the exclusion of observations with missing data, the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel 




sampled firms by industry at the 3-digit NAICS code level. Although the sample spans a wide 
range of manufacturing industries, it remains dominated by four industries collectively 





Manufacturing firms (NAICS 31-33) 
Listed on NYSE, AMEX, or 
R&D-to-sales ratio ≤ 1 
Market Cap ≥ $300M & Revenue ≥ 
Analyst coverage ≥ 5 analysts 
Final sample = 864 firms and 3,128 firm-year observations 
Figure 2 – Sampling procedure 




Three data sources were used to construct the measures for the dependent, independent 
and control variables. First, the COMPUSTAT database was used to collect firm accounting 
data. Second, the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) database was used to collect 
firm historical stock prices and dividend distributions, as well as market index levels. Third, the 
I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers' Estimate System) database was used to collect analyst estimates of 
future firm revenues. 
Dependent variable 
A firm’s long-term value creation potential has been measured in a variety of ways in the 
extant literature. Although researchers have used both objective and subjective measures, the 
latter are more commonly employed in research studying privately held companies and 
individual business units of larger conglomerates (e.g., Dess and Robinson, 1984; Fang et al., 
2007). Objective measures of long-term value creation are mostly market-based (e.g., Hillman 
and Keim, 2001; Uotila et al., 2009). The tendency to use the stock market as a gauge for the 
long-term value creation potential of organizations is premised on the efficient market 
hypothesis, which stipulates that the stock market efficiently evaluates future cash flows of 
organizations and appropriately prices them in the long run (Fama, 1998). Most market-based 
measures are, therefore, forward-looking and capture the long-term value creation potential of 
organizations. 
In this study, I use the price-to-sales (P2S) ratio to assess a firm’s long-term value 
creation potential. This valuation metric is popular in research and industry as a measure of the 
stock market’s expectation of a firm’s long-term value creation potential (e.g., Brunnermeier and 
Nagel, 2004). P2S expresses a firm’s market capitalization as a multiple of the firm’s most recent 




proceeds into positive cash flows into perpetuity. The P2S ratio is preferred over other popular 
financial multiples for the purposes of this study because it assumes business continuity and 
accommodates the assessment of firms with negative earnings, unlike price-to-book and price-to-
earnings respectively (e.g., Brunnermeir and Nagel, 2004; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 
2004). The price-to-sales ratio (P2S) for firm i is measured over the firm’s first fiscal quarter of 





where MktCap.%|01234 is firm i’s average market capitalization during the first quarter following 
the firm’s most recent fiscal-year end (i.e., Q1|FY9%), and Sales012 is firm i’s annual sales in 







where pij is firm i’s closing stock price on trading day j of Q1|FYt+1, SharesOutstandingij is the 
number of firm i shares outstanding in trading day j, and n is the total number of days firm i 
traded during Q1|FY9%. Sales figures were retrieved from the COMPUSTAT database. Stock 
prices and daily numbers of shares outstanding were obtained from the CRSP database. 
P2S ratios are measured using the firm’s average market capitalization over Q1|FY+1 
instead of the entire year following the most recent fiscal year-end in order to eliminate the 
confounding effects of subsequent quarterly earnings announcements on the market’s assessment 
of the firm’s long term value creation potential. As prior research has shown, markets adjust their 
assessment of long-term value as new material information, such as that contained in earnings 




A myriad of alternative market-based measures of long-term value creation have been 
used in prior research. The most common ones include Tobin’s Q and excess returns. While both 
present benefits, they suffer shortcomings that make unsuitable for the current study. Tobin’s Q 
(Brainard and Tobin, 1968) is the ratio of outstanding financial claims on an organization over 
the current replacement costs of the organization’s assets. A major downside to Tobin’s Q is that 
its denominator is difficult to estimate. Not only is it challenging to assess the value of intangible 
assets (Hillman and Keim, 2001), it is also extremely difficult to accurately evaluate the current 
replacement costs of assets (Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997). Most of the literature uses a 
workaround approach to estimate the ratio’s denominator by using firm book value as a proxy 
(e.g., Richard et al., 2007), but this approach has been deemed inadequate in prior research 
(Lewellen and Bardinath (1997). 
Excess returns, on the other hand, measure the marginal return of a company’s stock 
above and beyond what is expected of companies with similar levels of volatility (e.g., 
McDonald et al., 2008). This measure is inherently backward-looking as it captures a stock’s 
performance over a given period in the past. It is also ambiguous as to whether such past 
performance can be indicative of future performance (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004). In 
addition, excess returns are often used as a proxy for a firm’s short-term rather than long-term 
value creation (e.g., Li and Tallman, 2011). 
Independent variables 
Operational excellence is inherently multidimensional and context-specific. Different 
measures have been used in the OM literature to assess different aspects of operational 
excellence. From inventory levels and order variability (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) to capacity 




the measures abound and vary by context and research question. In an attempt to create an 
integrative multidimensional measure that captures the essence of operational excellence in the 
manufacturing context, Bharadwaj et al. (2007) developed an index score combining three 
objective metrics of operational performance – i.e., inventory turns, on-time (backlog) ratio, and 
gross margin. The measure is appropriate for the current study because it captures the three key 
dimensions of operational excellence as conceptualized in this study – i.e., efficiency, 
effectiveness, and operating profitability. It is also appropriate because it was developed 
specifically for the manufacturing context, which is the focus of this study. In order to minimize 
the number of instances of undefined ratios because of a zero denominator (e.g., inventory turns 
for a company that reports no inventory), an adapted version of Bharadwaj et al.’s (2007) 
measure is used. Instead of inventory turns, I use inventory-to-sales ratio; and instead of on-time 
ratio, I use backlog ratio calculated as the ratio of backlogs to the sum of backlogs and sales per 
fiscal year. I also use (1-gross margin) instead of gross margin in order to scale all three 
dimensions in the same direction. Since the three metrics have disparate scales, I converted them 
into t-scores at the 3-digit-NAICS-code level for each year of the sampling period. This 
transformation puts all three components of the Operational Excellence variable on equal footing 
and effectively ensures that no one component dominates the overall index score. It also enables 
the adjustment for inter-industry differences by evaluating firms within their respective 3-digit-
NAICS codes (e.g., York and Miree, 2004). The final index score is then constructed as the sum 
of the three metrics multiplied by -1 such that higher scores represent greater operational 
excellence. All three metrics are constructed from data available in the COMPUSTAT database. 
Firm Short-Term Growth Expectation is measured as the ratio of the equity analyst 




t-1. Consensus estimates are calculated as the simple average of estimates issued by all analysts 
following the firm during the last month of the firm’s fiscal year (Bowers et al., 2014). Prior 
research recommends using consensus estimates from the last fiscal month for their richer 
information content (McNichols, 1989) and increased accuracy (Kasznik and Lev, 1995). 
Analyst estimates are retrieved from the I/B/E/S database. 
Firm R&D Efforts is operationalized using an industry-adjusted version of the customary R&D 
intensity measure – i.e., the ratio of firm research and development expenditures to firm total 
sales in fiscal year t (e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). The ratio reflects the extent to which 
a firm reinvests sales proceeds into exploratory initiatives meant to improve the firm’s long-term 
value creation prospects. Because R&D expenditures can vary significantly across industries, it 
is important to control for unobserved industry effects. As such, each firm-year R&D intensity 
measure is converted into a t-score at the 3-digit NAICS code level for each year of the sampling 
period, in the same way I converted the three components of the operational excellence measure. 
R&D expenditures and sales data were retrieved from the COMPUSTAT database. 
Control variables 
Three firm and market factors known to influence firm market capitalization are used as 
control variables in this study. First, I control for revenue surprise – i.e., the extent to which a 
firm’s revenue for the fiscal year differs from the most recent equity analyst consensus estimate. 
Analyst estimates are a major determining factor in the valuation of public equities (Bowers et 
al., 2014). They represent a vital source of information about the probable financial condition of 
public corporations ahead of quarterly earnings announcements (Gleason and Lee, 2003). As 
such, they are closely watched by the investment community and serve as a guidepost in the 




tend to see a positive market reaction in the form of stock price appreciation, whereas firms that 
miss expectations tend to experience a drop in the value of their stock (Kasznick and McNichols, 
2002). In this study, I control for Revenue Surprise – i.e., the difference between actual revenues 
and the consensus revenue estimate (Alan et al., 2014). 
Second, I control for dividend yield in the first quarter following the current fiscal year. 
Firm long-term value (as reflected in its stock price) is often calculated as the net present value 
of future cash flows (Brealey et al., 2012). When a firm distributes a dividend, it reduces the 
amount of future cash flows by an equivalent amount. As such, equity prices should adjust down 
any time a dividend is accrued, and they should do so by the amount of the dividend (Bali and 
Hite, 1998). Dividend Yield is calculated as the ratio of quarterly ordinary dividends to the 
firm’s average market capitalization in the first quarter of fiscal year t+1 (i.e.,	Q1|FY9%). 
Third, I control for the overall stock market performance. Asset pricing models such as 
the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) suggest that individual stock prices are driven by 
idiosyncratic firm characteristics as well as overall market conditions and returns (e.g., Lintner, 
1965). Overall market returns are measured as the rate of return of the S&P 500 index 
contemporaneous to Q1|FY9% – i.e., the quarter when the dependent variable is measured for 
each firm i. For clarity, the timeline of measurement of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables is summarized in Figure 4. Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations are provided 









































Table 1 - Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
             
Variable/construct Obs. Mean s.d. 1   2   3   4   5   6   
1 . Price-to-Sales Ratio 3128 2.693 3.753 
            
2 . Revenue Surprise 3128 0.002 0.030 0.137 * 
          
3 . Dividend Yield 3128 0.003 0.008 -0.093 * -0.014 
         
4 . Market Return 3128 1.127 0.059 0.091 * -0.014 
 
-0.023 
       
5 . Operational Excellence 3128 2.142 4.884 0.161 * 0.043 * 0.016 
 
-0.137 * 
    






7 . R&D Efforts 3128 -0.411 12.523 0.342 * 0.066 * -0.051 * 0.000   -0.046 * 0.064 * 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 





Model specification and estimation 
As mentioned earlier, the dataset used in this study consists of an unbalanced panel of 
864 firms and 3,128 firm-year observations over the period 2010-2015. As such, I first test for 
the presence of panel effects: a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test indicates that 
the variance across panel units is not zero, providing evidence for the presence of panel effects 
(χ2 = 853; p-value<0.001). The Wooldridge’s Lagrange Multiplier test, in turn, provides 
evidence for first-order autocorrelation of residuals (F-statistic = 4.08; p-value=0.04), prompting 
us to model errors as an AR(1) process. 
Besides panel effects, I also recognize the concern of omitted variable bias. Many 
unmeasured phenomena could potentially have an effect on the dependent variable. Such omitted 
variables are problematic as they cause estimates to be biased. When that is the case, using a 
fixed-effects (FE) model corrects for the bias by adding unit-level dummy variables. While the 
FE method can be effective in producing unbiased estimates, it is substantially less efficient than 
random-effects (RE) modeling. It is common practice for scholars to run a Hausman test to 
assess whether an FE or an RE model is superior for the dataset at hand. Despite the ubiquity of 
this practice, however, many scholars have spoken against its adequacy (e.g., Bell and Jones, 
2015). In fact, some said that “it is ‘neither necessary nor sufficient’ (Clark and Linzer 2012, 2) 
to use the Hausman test as the sole basis of a researcher’s ultimate methodological decision” 
(Bell and Jones, 2015, p.139). The decision should depend on contextual and theoretical 
considerations that go beyond the Hausman test, as long as the covariates used in the model are 
not correlated with the residuals of the RE model (Kennedy, 2003). As such, the ultimate test for 
whether or not RE modeling is appropriate is to run pairwise correlations between the RE 




that only one variable is correlated (r = - 0.079; p-value<0.001) with the residuals. As such, there 
is no strong statistical basis for preferring an FE over an RE model for the dataset at hand; even 
more so that there is a strong theoretical and contextual rationale for using an RE model. RE 
models are used to explain long-run effects while FE models are used to explain short-run effects 
(Kennedy, 2003). Given the long-run nature of the relationships under investigation in this study, 
an RE model is deemed appropriate. Therefore, the following random-effects model with AR(1) 
disturbances is estimated using the xtregar procedure in STATA: 
P2S.%|01234 = μ + α%RevenueSurprise012 + α&DividendYield.%|01234
+ α'S&P500RateOfReturn.%|01234 + α(OpEx01I
+ α)RevGrowthExpectations012 + αKR&D2Sales012
+ αLOpEx ∗ RevGrowthExpectations012 + αMOpEx ∗ R&D2Sales012 					+ (μO
+ ε01234) 
where μ is the overall intercept term and (μ + ε01234)	is a composite error term comprising a 
random intercept component (μ) measuring the extent to which firm i’s intercept differs from 
the overall intercept μ, and a within-firm disturbance component (ε01234) reflecting the random 
deviation of firm i form the sample average in period t+1. ε01234is modeled as an AR(1) process 
due to the presence of first-order autocorrelation.  
 In an effort to ascertain the validity and robustness of the above RE model, a between-
effects (BE) model was also estimated. Between-effects models collapse time-series values of 
the dependent and independent variables into single average values for each panel unit (i.e., each 
firm in this study) and run a cross-sectional OLS regression on the transformed data (Kennedy, 
2003). As such between-effects models ignore short-run, within-unit variances and exclusively 





The empirical results are presented in Table 2. Panels A and B, respectively, show the 
main-effect and full-model results of the autoregressive random-effects model. Panels C and D, 
in turn, show the equivalent estimates of the between-effects model analyzed to assess the 
robustness of the random-effects results.  
Starting with panel A, all three controls have their expected signs – with two being 
statistically significant. In line with expectations, firm revenue surprise is found to positively 
influence the stock market’s assessment of long-term value creation (α1 = 4.028; p = 0.005). The 
S&P 500 rate of return is also found to have a similarly positive effect (α3 = 3.672; p<0.001). 
Dividend yield is not found to have a significant impact on the stock market’s anticipation of 
firm long-term value creation. Regarding the main independent variable of interest, the positive 
and statistically significant coefficient estimate of Operational Excellence (α4 = 0.035; p = 
0.001) suggests that the stock market views operational excellence as a positive signal for firm 
long-term value creation, thus providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
In Panel B, interaction terms are added to assess how market- and firm-level 
characteristics moderate the relationship between operational excellence and long-term value 
creation. Hypothesis 2 proposes that the stock market will view operational excellence less 
positively the more optimistic it is about a firm’s short-term revenue growth prospects. The 
estimation results provide support for this hypothesis, as evidenced by the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate of the interaction term between operational 
excellence and short-term revenue growth expectations (α7 = – 0.006; p = 0.008). This finding is 
of particular interest because it provides a boundary condition to the long-term value creation 







Table 2 – Estimation results; DV = Firm price-to-sales ratio 
Variables 
Random effects with AR(1) disturbances  Between effects 
A B   C D 
Intercept -1.327 ** -1.478 ** -27.244 *** -27.751 *** 
(0.666) (0.677) (5.077) (5.006) 
 
Control Variables 
Revenue Surprise 4.028 *** 4.633 *** 17.051 *** 14.543 *** 
(1.431) (1.453) (4.336) (4.330) 
Dividend Yield -8.398 -8.700 -74.707 *** -67.269 *** 
(5.281) (5.355) (23.471) (23.147) 
Market Return 3.672 *** 3.752 *** 26.511 *** 26.932 *** 
(0.577) (0.587) (4.495) (4.432) 
Independent Variables 
Operational Excellence (OpEx) 0.035 *** 0.036 *** 0.193 *** 0.185 *** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.030) 
Revenue Growth Expectations 0.022 0.067 *** -0.003 0.029 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.031) 
R&D Efforts 0.098 *** 0.098 *** 0.117 *** 0.110 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Interactions 
OpEx * Rev. Growth Expectations -0.006 *** -0.011 * 
(0.002) (0.006) 
OpEx * R&D Efforts 0.002 ** 0.011 *** 
      (0.001)         (0.002)   
R2 0.151 0.163 0.146 0.164 
Wald χ2 267.580 *** 291.910 *** - - 
F-statistic -   -     45.590 *** 39.000 *** 
# of Observations 3128 3128 3128 3128 
# of Firms  864   864     864   864   




  The second moderating effect pertains to firm R&D efforts. Hypothesis 3 suggests that 
firm R&D efforts will amplify the stock market’s positive assessment of operational excellence 
as an effective instrument for long-term value creation. The estimation results provide support 
for the hypothesis as shown by the positive and statistically (marginally) significant coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term between operational excellence and firm R&D efforts (α8=0.002; 
p=0.069). In line with the organizational ambidexterity literature, this finding indicates that 
capital markets do indeed put a premium on organizations that balance exploitative and 
exploratory initiatives. 
The empirical results from panels C and D provide further support for the aforementioned 
findings. As stated earlier, between-effects analyses were undertaken to ascertain the validity and 
robustness of the random effects estimates. Such consistency of findings speaks to the robustness 
of the empirical results to variations in estimation techniques. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This research explores the stock market’s ex-ante assessment of operational excellence as 
a long-term value creation instrument in the manufacturing sector. The study’s findings provide 
empirical evidence for a positive assessment; firms that demonstrate higher levels of operational 
excellence are valued at a premium compared to peers. Based on the estimation results, the stock 
market puts a 6.5% premium on firms that are one standard deviation above average on the 
operational excellence scale, all else equal. This finding carries substantial economic 
significance and reflects the stock market’s positive outlook on the operational achievement’s 
long-term value creation potential. It also echoes a sentiment shared by a DuPont executive that 
“operational excellence is one of the most important contributors to an organization’s sustainable 




The stock market does acknowledge, however, that the anticipated long-term benefits of 
operational excellence are not of equal magnitude across contexts. In fact, it is shown that stock 
market participants tend to reward operational excellence significantly less under conditions of 
abundant growth opportunities. The more analysts expect a firm to grow its revenues in the short 
term, the less favorably the stock market views its operational excellence as an instrument for 
long-term value creation; and the lower a premium it puts on the operational achievement. This 
finding indicates that operational excellence under conditions of abundant growth opportunities 
is viewed as a sign of misaligned priorities whereby market share gains may be sacrificed in an 
overzealous and counterproductive pursuit of short-term operational excellence. Conversely, 
when markets are more mature and growth opportunities more scarce, the stock market tends to 
reward operational excellence significantly more generously. 
The third key finding of this research pertains to the amplifying effect of firm R&D 
efforts on the stock market’s positive assessment of operational excellence as an instrument for 
long-term value creation. One explanation of this finding is that market participants view firm 
exploratory efforts as a hedging mechanism that helps mitigate the risk of competency traps 
(Levitt and March, 1988). Firms that fail to engage in such efforts are viewed as myopic and at 
risk of becoming overinvested in process management capabilities that may lose relevance in the 
long term (e.g., capabilities related to the manufacturing of internal combustion engines in the 
automotive industry). Firms that invest in R&D signal a willingness to experiment with new 
ideas and may, hence, be viewed as less likely to suffer the negative effects of entrenched 
routinization dynamics (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Such experimentation efforts enrich the 
firm’s knowledge pool and enhance its adaptive capabilities (March, 1991), with a positive 




Taken together, the study’s findings indicate that the stock market views operational 
excellence as inherently beneficial to firm long-term value creation. The results also indicate that 
the market’s positive outlook is adjusted based on strategic fit and firm exploratory efforts. Firms 
that aggressively pursue operational excellence under conditions of abundant growth 
opportunities signal strategic misfit and misaligned priorities that force a counterproductive 
tradeoff between operational excellence and firm revenue growth. Firms that fail to reinvest a 
sufficient amount of the proceeds of operational excellence in exploratory efforts are viewed as 
too short-term oriented, biased towards exploitation, and at risk of trading long-term viability for 
short-term profitability.  
This research contributes to theory and practice in several ways. First, it advances our 
understanding of the strategic value of process management. By linking operational excellence to 
long-term value creation, this research provides evidence that process management practices are 
not necessarily myopic and counter-productive in the long run. It also indicates that the warnings 
voiced within the productivity dilemma literature may not be warranted as is, and should perhaps 
be redirected towards the improper implementation of process management practices instead of 
suggesting that the practices are intrinsically at odds with long-term value creation. Second, this 
research provides guidance for top managers as to the conditions under which the long-term 
value creation potential of (properly implemented) process management practices may be 
enhanced or dampened. As it stands, the extant literature is too coarse-grained and could induce 
suboptimal decision making and resource misallocation. Managers subscribing to the 
productivity dilemma narrative may unduly discount the long-term benefits of operational 
excellence and underinvest in process management as a result, while those subscribing to a 




contingencies call for. This research provides the stock market’s perspective on two major 
contingencies – firm short-term revenue growth prospects and firm R&D efforts – as a guidepost 
to help reduce the risk of suboptimal strategy formulations. Third, and in light of prior research 
showing the stock market’s influence on top management teams and firm conduct (e.g., Gentry 
and Shen, 2013; Puffer and Weintrop, 1991), this research may provide a rationale as to why 
many top executives continue to emphasize process management practices and associated 
operational excellence as key enablers of sustained competitive advantage despite numerous 
warnings from the productivity dilemma literature. 
We hope that this research will stimulate further investigation of the strategic value of 
operational excellence in particular and operations management in general. While the study 
presents evidence of moderating effects of the stock market’s expectations of firm short-term 
revenue growth expectations and firm exploratory efforts, future research can explore other 
contingency factors that can further qualify the relationship between operational excellence and 
long-term value creation. Future studies may also consider developing context-specific 
conceptualizations and measurements for operational excellence. The three-dimensional 
conceptualization adopted in this paper has been developed for the manufacturing context and 
may not be as readily applicable to other contexts. Future studies may explore alternate 
conceptualizations and measurements – particularly in the service sector – to help advance our 
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IV. Essay 3 – Operations orientation pre and post market shifts: When the blessing 
turns into a curse  
 
Abstract 
Operations management capabilities are executional levers that facilitate the efficient and 
effective fulfillment of a firm’s strategic promise. Their propensity to create value is, however, 
contingent on the continued appeal of the firm’s strategic promise in the marketplace. When 
target customers deem the promise intrinsically appealing, operations management capabilities 
serve as compounding levers that enhance customer value creation and facilitate shareholder 
value appropriation. When the promise loses its appeal or ceases to trigger customer interest, as 
it often does when markets shift, the capabilities lose relevance and become less conducive to 
competitive advantage. This exploratory essay discusses the effects of a firm’s pursuit of 
operations management capabilities as a primary competitive weapon (i.e., operations 
orientation) pre and post market shifts as well as the impact of such orientation on the firm’s 
ability to adapt when customer preferences shift in material ways. Three research propositions 






Operations management capabilities are potent enablers of customer value creation 
(Langley and Holcomb, 1992) and a major source of competitive advantage (Hult et al., 2007). 
Companies such as Walmart, McDonald’s, and Dell – to name a few – have notoriously 
leveraged such capabilities to propel themselves to the forefront of their respective industries. 
Walmart’s ability to effectively and efficiently distribute a wide range of products across an 
expansive logistics network has largely contributed to the company’s global leadership in retail 
(Barney, 2012). As of 2016, Walmart is by far the world’s largest retailer by revenue, with global 
sales surpassing those of the next four competitors combined (Deloitte, 2017). Similarly, 
McDonald’s global supremacy in the fast food industry is largely attributable to the company’s 
streamlined operations and superior logistics and supply chain management capabilities. 
McDonald’s promises its patrons speedy and consistent service anywhere in the world and 
leverages superior operations management capabilities and associated operational excellence to 
fulfill the promise. In some markets (e.g., the state of Florida in the US), it guarantees orders to 
be ready within 60 seconds – a performance unmatched by the closest competition (Wong, 
2014). Lastly, Dell’s rise to the top of the PC industry through the 1990’s and early 2000’s is 
often attributed to the company’s successful pioneering of a direct-sales model and a build-to-
order approach to PC manufacturing; both enabled by superior operations management 
capabilities (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2005).  
In recent years, however, all three companies have suffered strong competitive 
headwinds due to the emergence of innovative market alternatives with more attractive customer 
value propositions. Walmart’s dominance in the retail industry is increasingly threatened by 




experience compared to brick-and-mortar stores. McDonald’s value proposition centered around 
speed and consistency appears to be losing its appeal next to healthier yet equally accessible 
alternatives from competing chains such as Subway (e.g., Kowitt, 2014, Torres, 2016). And 
Dell’s leadership in the PC market has long been eroded due to the company’s failure to adapt its 
operations and supply chain management capabilities to the laptop market after a longstanding 
domination in the desktop segment (e.g., Darlin, 2006; Knowledge@Wharton, 2007).  
Many of the challenges faced by these three companies—and others in similar 
situations—seem to be, at least partly, due to a lack of fit between legacy operations 
management capabilities and a new market reality. All three companies appear to have been 
blindsided by major market shifts caused by the emergence of alternative value propositions that 
rendered their own less attractive in the marketplace. As consumer preferences shifted, the 
companies’ legacy operations management capabilities became less relevant and, hence, less 
conducive to competitive advantage. Walmart’s ability to efficiently and effectively move 
product in pallets and case packs from manufacturers to stores through distribution centers 
proved of limited value in the online channel where products needed to be picked, packed, and 
shipped in individual units and delivered to customer-designated locations. Similarly, Dell’s 
mass-customization strategy that proved effective in the desktop segment could not be replicated 
in the laptop market where the finished product was more compact and less amenable to delayed 
differentiation. 
In this essay, I explore a key mechanism that causes firms to grow overinvested in 
obsolete operations management capabilities at the expense of strategic foresight and market 
adaptation. Market stability is suggested as a double-edged sword that, on the one hand, 




value creation and shareholder value appropriation and, on the other hand, causes firms to 
potentially overestimate the sustainability of such benefits which may, ultimately, have negative 
ramifications for a firm’s ability to adapt to subsequent changes in market conditions. In this 
essay, I first discuss the value creation potential of operations management capabilities. Then I 
discuss the proposed mechanism through which firms grow overinvested in obsolete operations 
management capabilities at the expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. Three 
research propositions are made accordingly. 
 
Operations management capabilities and value creation 
Operations management capabilities are executional levers that enable the efficient and 
effective fulfillment of an organization’s strategic promise (Adam and Swamidass, 1989; 
Mentzer et al., 2008). Their propensity to create value is, however, contingent on the continued 
appeal of the organization’s promise in the marketplace. When target customers deem the 
promise intrinsically appealing, operations management capabilities serve as compounding 
levers (cf. Figure 1) that enhance customer value creation (e.g., affordability, service 








Competitive Advantage Executional Levers Core Competency 
Figure 1 – Operations management capabilities as compounding levers for customer value 





When the promise loses its appeal or ceases to trigger customer interest, as it often does 
when markets shift, operations management capabilities that used to serve as valuable 
compounding levers become less relevant – simply because a promise deemed intrinsically 
unattractive will remain so regardless of the efficiency and effectiveness with which it is 
fulfilled.  
The value creation of operations management capabilities can therefore be more or less 
transient depending on the level of stability4 in a firm’s product-market. Many scholars have 
argued that such capabilities are more likely to be beneficial under stable market conditions 
where a firm’s promise remains relevant for an extended period of time (e.g., Miles et al., 1978; 
Benner and Tushman, 2003). Under such conditions, operations management capabilities are 
effective in creating and capturing value through incremental process improvements, efficiency 
enhancements, and service differentiation (Ahire and Dreyfus, 2000). When markets shift in 
material ways, however, an ex-ante focus on operations management capabilities becomes less 
conducive to competitive advantage and often turns into a source of rigidity that undermines 
organizational adaptation and long-term value creation (Benner and Tushman, 2003). 
The fact that the value creation potential of any set of operations management capabilities 
is inherently transient has been recognized and extensively addressed by both scholars and 
practitioners (Hayes and Upton, 1998). Prior research addressing this risk of obsolescence has 
                                                 
4 Markets are stable as long as no major disruption occurs whereby a dominant value proposition 
is existentially challenged. For example, the car market had been stable for decades until the 
dominant value proposition of human-driven, internal-combustion-engine vehicles started to be 
challenged by new comers offering fully-electric, self-driving vehicles as a more compelling 
mode of personal transportation. Similarly, the cell-phone manufacturing industry had been 





repeatedly prescribed that firms continuously revise and adjust their operational capabilities to 
keep pace with changing market dynamics (Brumme et al., 2015). Upton and Hayes (1998) argue 
that proper operations management requires ongoing invention to ascertain continued relevance 
of key capabilities. Similarly, practitioners acknowledge the need for adaptive capabilities in 
operations management. For example, Walmart CEO, Doug McMillon, recently commented that 
“retail history is very clear. Those that are unwilling or unable to change go away. (…) To win, 
we must run the business well today and change the business for the future” (Walmart, 2015).  
However, such adaptability remains extremely challenging to develop and maintain due 
to various structural and behavioral inhibitors (e.g., Hayes and Upton, 1998). One such inhibitor, 
I argue, is the conditioning mechanism that takes place under stable market conditions. 
Essentially, I contend that market stability has a biasing effect on organizational sense-making 
(Weick, 1995) whereby firms develop exaggerated associations between a narrow set of 
operations management capabilities and sustained competitive advantage. The argument is that 
the longer a firm operates under stable market conditions, the more conditioned it becomes to 
associating operations management capabilities with operational excellence and superior 
performance. As such, market stability is argued to induce a strong operations orientation with a 
substantial risk of overinvestment in inferior/obsolete operations management capabilities. 
On the risk of overinvestment in obsolete operations management capabilities 
An organization’s overinvestment in obsolete operations management capabilities is 
inherently accidental; it iteratively and unintentionally develops over time in a self-reinforcing 
cycle that takes hold under stable market conditions. When markets are stable, initial investments 
in operations management capabilities tend to improve operational excellence and generate 




organizations are compelled to further invest in the same capabilities in hopes of duplicating the 
initially observed performance benefits (Levitt and March, 1988). With more investments, 
operational excellence continues to improve and performance gains continue to follow – making 
additional investments all the more compelling, and creating momentum for a self-reinforcing 
cycle iterating additional investments, operational excellence, and performance gains (cf. Figure 
2).  
 
After a few iterations, the link between operational excellence and performance gains 
becomes increasingly perceived within the organization as more systematic than it actually is. 
While this overconfidence in the virtuous nature of the cycle may not be problematic under 
stable market conditions, it becomes extremely so when markets shift. 
When a shift occurs, the virtuous cycle is broken and performance gains no longer follow 












Stable Market Conditions 
Figure 2 – The virtuous cycle of investments in operations management (OM) 




organization is too conditioned to change course (Walsh and Ungson, 1991). It mindlessly 
extrapolates past realizations into the future (Levinthal and March, 1993) and continues to invest, 
in an escalation of commitment to old routines that have proven effective in the past but may not 
be as effective in a post-shift environment (Staw, 1981). Ultimately, the organization becomes 
overinvested in inferior operations management capabilities, and falls into a competency trap as 
a result (Levitt and March, 1988). 
To illustrate, consider the example of McDonald’s whose promise of speed, taste, and 
consistency had been – until very recently – intrinsically appealing to a growing customer base. 
As customers showed interest, McDonald’s superior operations and supply chain management 
capabilities amplified customer value creation through competitive pricing and service 
differentiation and improved shareholder value appropriation through enhanced profitability. In 
recent years, however, the company’s promise came under pressure due to the emergence of 
healthier market alternatives. A significant portion of the company’s customer base shifted to 
healthier eating (Kowitt, 2014) and no longer considered the company’s promise as intrinsically 
appealing. Speed and consistency were no longer sufficient to sustain customer interest; many 
customers expected fresh and healthy eating, in addition to speed and consistency. This shift in 
consumer preferences caused McDonald’s to suffer a significant decline in in same-store sales 
(Strom, 2012) as it rendered the company’s existing operations and supply chain management 
capabilities less conducive to competitive advantage due to their limited capacity to efficiently 
and effectively accommodate locally sourced fresh ingredients. 
Yet, after years of successfully leveraging the same speed- and consistency-enabling 
operations and supply chain management capabilities, McDonald’s had grown conditioned to 




challenges. As such, the company’s initial reaction to the decline in same-store sales was to 
further invest in operational excellence so as to reduce order processing time (Kowitt, 2014). It 
even instituted a 60-second-or-less guarantee whereby customers were promised a free sandwich 
if they did not receive their food within 60 seconds (Wong, 2014). But sales continued to 
decline. What the company failed to realize was that sales were declining not because orders 
were not filled fast enough, but because consumers were shifting to healthier dining options 
(Kowitt, 2014). In a sense, the company’s initial operational excellence core competency turned 
into a core rigidity and hindered the company’s strategic foresight and market adaptation. 
McDonalds eventually recognized the shift in consumer preferences and initiated efforts to 
amend its menu accordingly, after many years of maladaptive behavior (Snyder, 2016). 
Research propositions  
The above discussion addresses some strategic limitations of the pursuit of operations 
management capabilities as a means to achieve operational excellence and facilitate superior 
customer value creation and shareholder value appropriation. The central argument is that such a 
pursuit may be so effective under stable market conditions that it causes organizational sense-
making to grow biased towards an exaggerated association between existing operations 
management capabilities and competitive advantage. Market stability is argued to serve as a 
double-edged sword that, on the one hand, provides an ideal environment for the effective 
leverage of operations management capabilities and associated operational excellence to boost 
firm performance and, on the other, causes firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of such 
capabilities with negative ramifications on firm strategic foresight and market adaptation. Three 
distinct evolutionary dynamics composing this process can be identified as shown in Figure 3. 




potential to collectively increase the risk of rigidity and organizational maladaptation in the face 
of radical shifts. In extreme cases, they can lead firms to grow out of sync with their competitive 
environments and eventually fade into irrelevance as a result. 
 
 
Phase I: Market stability and operations orientation  
Numerous schools of thought in organization theory suggest that firms are largely shaped 
by the environment in which they operate (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Resource dependence theory, for example, suggests that firms 
are open systems subject to conflicting pressures from various interest groups and that a key 
mission of top management teams is to channel those pressures in a way that best facilitates the 
attainment of organizational goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). One way top management teams 
channel such pressures is by adjusting their attention and resource allocation based on the 
intensity of each pressure (Ocasio, 1997). For example, in environments characterized by strong 
competitive pressures such that existing value propositions are repeatedly challenged and 
dethroned by new ones (e.g., the computing and digital storage industry), top management teams 
are compelled to dedicate substantial resources and attention to environmental scanning and 
competitive monitoring in order to safeguard their market position and ensure the continued 
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relevance of their firm’s value proposition (Miles et al., 1978). Conversely, in more stable 
markets where a mainstream value proposition has little to no existential threat to its continued 
appeal (e.g., as is the case in the waste management industry), top management teams are 
generally less inclined to engage in competitive monitoring and more likely to focus on internal 
process improvements and operational excellence as a means to create superior value and help 
strengthen their firm’s market position (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). With such a focus, and 
given that process management and associated operational excellence tend to yield satisfactory 
results under conditions of market stability (Benner and Tushman, 2003), firms will tend to 
gradually gravitate towards a stronger reliance on operations management capabilities as a 
primary source of competitive advantage, for as long as their markets remain stable. This is in 
line with propositions from the organizational learning literature suggesting that firm conduct 
tends to be governed to a large extent by trial-and-error feedback loops whereby past actions that 
fail to yield desired outcomes are abandoned and successful ones (e.g., investments in operations 
management capabilities under stable market conditions) are repeated (Levitt and March, 1988). 
As such, I propose that firms will invest more and more heavily in operations management 
capabilities and associated operational excellence as their markets remain stable. 
Proposition 1: Market stability will be positively associated with a firm’s pronounced 
emphasis on operations management capabilities as a major source of competitive 
advantage - i.e., firms will develop a stronger operations orientation the longer their 
markets remain stable. 
Phase II: Operations orientation and reduced market awareness 
As firms develop a stronger operations orientation, they become more concerned with 




As such, they tend to design most organizational roles for intra-organizational coordination, with 
only limited efforts expended in the development of boundary-spanning communication channels 
(Aldrich and Herker, 1977). They also allocate more of their available resources to improving 
existing processes than to scanning the environment for competitive threats and market 
opportunities (Aldrich and Herker, 1977).  
While such an internal focus can be effective in stable market conditions (e.g., Carpenter 
and Westphal, 2001; Dean and Sharfman, 1996), it has the potential to significantly impair firm 
competitive awareness and adaptive capabilities. Miles et al. (1978) argue that defender firms 
with an operations orientation and an internal focus are at the mercy of market stability; they can 
only generate positive returns on their narrow focus to the extent that no major market shift 
occurs. When a shift occurs, however, firms with such an orientation are often blindsided by the 
turn of events and suffer significant performance losses as a result. 
Proposition 2: Operations orientation is negatively associated with a firm’s ability to 
foresee and/or adapt to structural market shifts 
Phase III: Length of pre-shift market stability and firm maladaptive behavior 
As discussed earlier, market stability not only induces firms to develop a pronounced 
operations orientation but also triggers a self-reinforcing process whereby incremental 
investments in operations management capabilities enhance operational excellence, which in turn 
strengthens firm competitive advantage. Over time, this iterative cycle starts to act as a 
conditioning mechanism that causes firms to ultimately elevate operations management 
capabilities and associated operational excellence from a means-to-an-end to an end in and of 
itself. In this essay, I argue that the longer a firm’s market remains stable, the stronger the 




operations management capabilities with performance gains. As such, length of market stability 
is expected to exacerbate firm maladaptive behavior as discussed in proposition 2 above. 
Proposition 3: Firm maladaptive behavior (P2) is exacerbated by the length of pre-shift 
market stability 
Discussion and conclusion  
This essay provides a brief account of an evolutionary mechanism that has the potential 
to cause firms to grow overinvested in operations management capabilities and associated 
operational excellence at the expense of strategic foresight and market adaptation. Such firms are 
said to be particularly vulnerable to structural market shifts. In extreme cases, they may be 
irreversibly blindsided by unfavorable market developments and may fade into irrelevance as a 
result. For example, Blockbuster—the once uncontested dominant of the home movie and video 
game rental industry—was blindsided by Netflix despite the former’s superior capabilities in 
managing the physical distribution process across an expansive network of brick-and-mortar 
stores. Blockbuster was so focused on perfecting its physical distribution operations that it failed 
to recognize the opportunities that the internet had to offer. Not only did it lack the strategic 
foresight to anticipate the internet’s potential as an effective and efficient distribution platform, it 
blindly dismissed its adoption by the competition as a non-threat. Blockbuster’s commitment to 
improving its physical-distribution model through operational excellence turned it myopic to 
Netflix’s potential to trigger a market shift that would subsequently undermine its (i.e., 
Blockbuster’s) value proposition. It underestimated the internet-based model and went so far as 
to decline, in 1999, an offer to take a 49% equity stake in Netflix in exchange for the latter using 
the domain name Blockbuster.com (The New York Times Conferences, 2015). This happened at 




revenue). A decade and a half later, Blockbuster is out of business and Netflix is an $8.8 billion 
company by revenue, $72 billion by market capitalization. 
Although not all operations-focused organizations are doomed to ultimately fall out favor 
as dramatically as Blockbuster did when markets shift, the risk that they see such an outcome is 
proposed to be positively related to the length of stability in the firms’ product-market prior to 
the shift. The longer a firm’s market remains stable, the more entrenched its operations 
orientation becomes and the weaker its ability to foresee and adapt to structural market shifts 
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This dissertation addressed the concept of operational excellence as it relates to firm 
performance in the short and long terms. Construed as the ultimate goal of operations 
management, operational excellence reflects a firm’s ability to run its day-to-day operations 
efficiently, effectively, and profitably (e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 2008; Mentzer et al., 2008; 
Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). For a typical brick-and-mortar retailer, operational excellence 
would for example entail achieving high on-shelf availability without compromising inventory 
efficiency such that a high level of profitability is attained. For a manufacturer, operational 
excellence would encompass the same inventory efficiency, but instead of on-shelf availability, 
manufacturers would have factors such as conformance quality, production flexibility, and 
supply readiness as key ingredients of operational excellence (e.g., Rosenzweig and Easton, 
2010). 
Although one might expect operational excellence to be unanimously viewed as a 
positive achievement for any and all organizations, scholars and practitioners alike have had 
nuanced views on the competency’s long-term value creation potential (e.g., Adler et al., 2009; 
Benner and Tushman, 2003; Kaplan and Norton, 2008). Diverging views have also been 
expressed as to how such excellence is achieved in the first place (e.g., Skinner, 1969; Clark, 
1996; Ferdows and De Meyer, 1990). Do companies have to outperform on both efficiency and 
effectiveness simultaneously to achieve operational excellence, or should they focus on one or 
the other instead? This dissertation addressed these questions and contentious relationships in 
three separate essays. 
Essay 1 examined the inner dynamics of operational excellence by looking at the 




was to assess the respective merits of two conflicting perspectives – the tradeoff and the 
cumulative perspectives – on whether firms can successfully improve efficiency and 
effectiveness simultaneously. Based on a large dataset of US public manufacturing firms, the 
empirical results revealed that most manufacturers experience positive returns on the 
simultaneous improvement of efficiency and effectiveness, indicating support for the cumulative 
perspective. This operational ambidexterity was found to have a compounding positive effect on 
firm profitability above and beyond what can be attributed to individual improvements to either 
efficiency or effectiveness in isolation. However, results also showed that the effect of 
operational ambidexterity can vary in magnitude and/or significance across industries, indicating 
the presence of idiosyncratic industry characteristics influencing the inner dynamics of 
operational excellence. 
In essay 2, I revisited a key argument in the productivity dilemma literature suggesting 
that firms with a pronounced emphasis on operational excellence may do well in the short-term 
but may also undergo excessive routinization dynamics at the expense of strategic adaptability 
(e.g., Benner and Tushman, 2003). Drawing on signaling theory and using the stock market as 
gauge for the long-term value creation potential of operational excellence, essay 2 provided 
empirical evidence that the operational competency tends to be viewed by the investment 
community as a leading indicator of superior future shareholder value. Results also showed that 
the investment community’s positive assessment is contingent on the community’s own 
expectations of a firm’s short-term revenue growth prospects and the firm’s research and 
development efforts. Short-term revenue growth expectations are found to exert as a dampening 




operational excellence whereas firm research and development was found to amplify the 
market’s positive outlook. 
In essay 3, I built on key arguments from the productivity dilemma literature to explore 
some strategic limitations to a firm’s pursuit of operational excellence as a major source of 
competitive advantage. More specifically, I discussed how market stability can act as a double-
edged sword that, on the one hand, provides an ideal environment for the effective leverage of 
operations management capabilities and associated operational excellence; and, on the other 
hand, causes firms to become overinvested in a narrow set of such capabilities at the expense of 
strategic foresight and market adaptation. I specifically discussed organizational learning 
dynamics that can explain why firms tend to gravitate towards operational excellence in periods 
of stability and how such a tendency may impair the firm’s ability to anticipate or adapt to 
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